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Preface 
This report was written by Tord Krogh during a student internship at the Research 
department, Statistics Norway in 2009/2010. It is part of a project – led by Eilev S. 
Jansen – to describe the evolution of credit conditions in Norway from 1970 to 
2008. 
 
There exists no other unified presentation of the regulatory changes in the 
Norwegian credit markets from 1970 to 2008. This entails a period with strict 
credit market regulations in the 1970s, the gradual deregulation of credit markets in 
the 1980s, followed by the subsequent banking crisis in the years around 1990 and 
the development thereafter up to the advent of the current financial crisis. It is 
hoped that the present documentation is of interest to a wider audience. 
 
Moreover, the report serves as a source of information for the construction of a 
Credit Conditions Index, which intends to capture variations in the availability of 
credit to the household sector. A preliminary version of such an index for Norway 
is found in Krogh (2010). 
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and Øivind Jonassen at the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) of Norway in 
finding documents in the archives of the FSA was also appreciated. 
 
 
Statistics Norway, Oslo/Kongsvinger. 
 
 
  
Credit regulations in Norway, 1970 - 2008 Reports 37/2010
4 Statistics Norway
Abstract 
Norwegian credit markets were heavily transformed during the 1970s and 1980s. In 
the early 70s credit policy aimed at "credit planning" by means of a comprehensive 
set of regulations, while by the end of the 1980s quantitative regulations, interest 
rate controls and foreign exchange controls had been fully removed. 
 
This report aims at giving a detailed summary of the regulatory changes related to 
Norwegian credit markets in the period 1970-2008. We have extracted the main 
content from 4 different series of official documents (Ministry of Finance (1969a-
2007a, 1970b-2008b), Norges Bank (1970a-2008a) and Financial Supervisory 
Authority of Norway (1986-2008)) and used this information to provide a unified 
presentation of the development. All the regulatory instruments that were used in 
the 1970s are described, and a detailed chronological description shows how and 
when these were applied. We also look at how the regulations were subsequently 
removed. Accompanying the description are 12 comprehensive tables in the 
Appendix. These summarise all the central information from the description, and in 
addition they contain some extra details. For instance, Table A.3 gives the level of 
the primary reserve requirements at each point in time, just as Table A.7 does for 
placement requirements, while Table A.6 contains details about all placement 
requirements that have been in place. 
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Sammendrag 
Det norske kredittmarkedet gikk gjennom voldsomme forandringer på 1970- og 
1980-tallet. Omkring 1970 ble det utøvet en penge- og kredittpolitikk som tok sikte 
på å kontrollere kredittgivningen eksplisitt ved hjelp av et vidt spekter av 
reguleringer. Innen slutten av 1980-tallet var både de kvantitative reguleringene, 
rentereguleringen samt valutareguleringen fjernet.  
 
Denne rapporten gir en detaljert sammenfatning av endringene i 
kredittmarkedsreguleringen i Norge i perioden 1970-2008. Vi har trukket ut 
hovedinformasjonen fra 4 ulike serier av offisielle dokumenter (Ministry of 
Finance (1969a-2007a, 1970b-2008b), Norges Bank (1970a-2008a) og Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway (1986-2008)) og brukt dette til å gi en helhetlig 
presentasjon av utviklingen. De ulike reguleringene som ble brukt på 70-tallet er 
nøye beskrevet, og i tillegg følger det en kronologisk gjennomgang av når og 
hvordan disse instrumentene ble brukt. Videre ser vi på prosessen da disse 
reguleringene så ble fjernet. I tillegg til denne beskrivelsen legges det ved 12 
detaljerte tabeller i Appendikset. Disse oppsummerer den sentrale beskrivelsen fra 
teksten, i tillegg til å presentere noen ekstra detaljer. For eksempel inneholder 
tabell A.3 og A.7 nivået på henholdsvis primærreservekravene og plasseringskravet 
gjennom hele perioden, mens tabell A.6 beskriver alle tilleggsreservekravene som 
har blitt innført.  
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1. Introduction 
The ambition of this report is to provide a detailed summary of the development of 
credit market regulations in Norway, with particular emphasis on regulation of 
banks. It is necessary to emphasize that this is in large part just a summary of the 
main sources that have been used. These works will not be cited every time 
information is presented, but if a reference different from one of these has been 
used it is stated explicitly. The main sources have been: 
• National Budgets and Revised National Budgets: Ministry of Finance (1969a-
2007a)1 and Ministry of Finance (1970b-2008b) 
• Annual Reports: Norges Bank (1970a-2008a) 
• Annual Reports: Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (1986-2008) 
 
Ministry of Finance (1970b-1978b) contain appendices discussing the credit policy 
of the government, and these have been the most important sources for the period 
1970-77. In Norges Bank (1970a-1986a) we find thorough descriptions of the credit 
policy and these have been used as main sources for the period 1978-86. After 1986 
these descriptions were omitted from the annual reports, but the reports still contain 
letters of announcement sent from Norges Bank to the financial institutions, and 
these are very useful (both before and after 1986). The descriptions of the credit 
policy found in Ministry of Finance (1985a-2007a) are better than in previous 
editions of the National Budget and were important sources for the period after 1985. 
Furthermore, annual reports from the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway 
(FSA of Norway) serve as important sources for material on bank losses and market 
conditions from 1986 and onwards. Letters sent from the FSA to financial 
institutions are also valuable.2  
 
The credit policy conducted in 1970-88 was in large part characterised by the 
authorities continuously attempting to keep the credit growth under control. To 
regulate banks primary reserve requirements were adjusted frequently while addition-
nal reserve requirements were imposed when the situation was about to get "out of 
hand" (all requirements are described in Section 2). Both banks and life insurance 
companies faced placement requirements, forcing them to invest a relatively large 
share of their capital in bonds. Finance companies and non-life insurance companies 
were in most of the years up to 1988 regulated with the use of quantitative limits. 
 
This policy was relatively successful in the late 1960s and beginning of the 70s, but 
later its effectiveness declined steadily. Figure 1.1 illustrates how the operative 
difficulties of "credit planning" became larger in the 1980s. This figure gives the 
percentage deviation between the credit supplied during a year relative to what the 
politicians had put up as bounds in the credit budget (to be explained in Section 2). 
It indicates how the authorities' grip with the credit market became looser through-
out the period, both due to a process of financial innovation (institutions were 
doing their best to sidestep the rules), change in efforts made to keep the flow of 
credit within the bounds of the budget and the gradual deregulation that took place. 
 
The figure ends in 1987 and by then most of the quantitative regulations had been 
removed. Capital and liquidity requirements were still present, but the government 
had given up controlling the flow of credit. 
 
As a preview of the events documented in Section 4, Table 1.1 provides a calendar 
of the major regulatory changes related to credit markets the past 40 years. 
Deregulation began in the end of the 1970s with the withdrawal of some interest 
rate and foreign exchange controls. It continued with the removal of quantitative 
regulations during the 1980s, while the most important changes since 1990 have 
                                                     
1 The National Budget of year t is published in year t-1 and is thus cited as Ministry of Finance (t-1). 
2 Most of these are downloadable at http://www.finanstilsynet.no. Letters that are not on the internet 
are available in the archives of the FSA. 
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been the introduction of the Basel I (in 1991) and Basel II (in 2007) accords, 
regulating the international standard of capital requirements. 
Figure 1.1.  Percentage deviation between the credit supplied and the bounds of the credit 
budget, 1966-87. Source: Norwegian Official Reports (1989) 
 
Table 1.1. Calendar of the major regulatory events 
December 1977:   Most of the interest rate norms removed - interest rates allowed to float freely.
September 1978: Wage and price freeze introduced (including interest rates). 
November 1978: Quantitative exchange controls for the banks removed. Zero total position (net 
spot and forward claims) the only requirement. 
December 1979:   Wage and price freeze ended. Interest rates were kept under informal 
regulation. 
September 1980: Interest rate declarations were introduced as a formal way to dictate interest 
rates. Less strict than interest rate norms. 
October 1980:    Bond issuing fully liberalised. 
October 1981:    Bond issuing partly re-regulated - direct regulation of loan associations 
introduced. 
January 1983: Introduction of direct regulation of guarantees issued by financial institutions 
for loans in the grey market. 
January 1984:    Additional reserve requirements removed. Intended to be a permanent 
removal. 
January 1985:    Banks' placement requirement revoked. Revoked for life insurance companies 
in July 1985. 
September 1985: Interest rate declarations abandoned. Interest rates allowed to float freely. 
September 1985: License requirement for domestic residents' borrowing abroad removed. 
January 1986:    Additional reserve requirements re-introduced. 
June 1987:       Banks' primary reserve requirements revoked. 
October 1987: Additional reserve requirements removed permanently. 
July 1988: Last part of the direct regulation of loan associations removed. The regulation 
of guarantees for loans in the grey market was also removed, as well as the 
direct regulation of private finance companies and non-life insurance 
companies. 
May 1989: Foreigners were permitted to invest unlimited in Norwegian bonds. 
June 1990:       New set of foreign exchange regulations introduced. 
April 1991: Basel Accord introduced. 
December 1996:   The Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) introduced. An update (CAD-II) came 
in June 2000. 
January 2007: Basel II implemented. 
 
The remaining of the report is organised in the following way: Section 2 describes 
the situation in the beginning of the 1970s and what instruments the government 
used in its conduct of credit policy. Section 3 gives some information regarding the 
"grey market" for loans that existed outside the balance-sheets of the financial 
institutions. Section 4 contains a detailed chronological description of credit policy 
since 1970. The intention of this is to both provide information about how the 
credit policy was conducted in each year per se, and also illustrate the main trends 
and give a snap shot of the situation almost 40 years ago. This section is 
accompanied by an extensive set of tables in the Appendix that contain more 
elaborate descriptions. Section 5 provides some concluding comments. 
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2. Status of credit regulations in 1970 
The credit and monetary policy of the government had two main goals: A low and 
stable level of interest rates and a careful injection of credit into the economy (see a 
contemporary description in Eide, 1973). The available credit was primarily to be 
used for investments and the government wanted to limit households' borrowing 
for consumption purposes. The basis for credit policy during this period was the 
Credit Law of 1965. This law specified the instruments available for the authorities 
and it replaced earlier laws (see Norwegian Official Reports (1980) for a brief 
description of the law). With the new law, credit policy was to change from being 
settled with explicit agreements between the government and the financial sector 
towards more indirect control where the authorities affected the liquidity of the 
credit market instead. 
 
The main document for the credit policy was the credit budget, of which the 
government published a comprehensive version every year. The budget specified 
the amount of credit the authorities found it desirable for the financial institutions 
to supply in the course of a year, and also how this was to be shared between 
different parts of the financial system.3 To make sure that the budget was met the 
government had several different regulations. In the early 1970s these can be 
described as follows:4 
• Quantitative regulations: a) Primary reserve requirements: Minimum 
requirement for the percentage of total assets that had to be held as primary 
reserves (i.e. deposits in Norges Bank, Postal Giro deposits and Post Office 
Savings Bank deposits (state banks), Treasury notes and notes and coins); b) 
Placement requirements: Requirement to invest a given percentage of the 
increase in total assets in the bond market; c) Additional reserve requirements: 
Requirement to put aside extra reserves given as a percentage of further growth 
in lending if lending exceeded a given limit; and d) Other direct regulations: 
The Credit Law also made it possible for the government to set discrete rules 
for permitted lending growth (i.e. less flexible for the firms but more direct 
control for the government) where a financial penalty was the result if a 
company exceeded its limit.  
• Interest rate controls: The most important interest rates on loans from the 
banks were regulated by the government through the use of interest rate norms.  
• Foreign exchange controls: Transactions with and access to foreign exchange 
was extensively regulated (i.e. capital mobility was low). Any sale or purchase 
of foreign exchange had to go through one of the authorised foreign exchange 
banks. Banks' access to lend with foreign banks, as well as their currency 
holdings, were directly regulated. If businesses or private persons wanted to 
take up a loan abroad (or a foreign currency loan through a domestic bank), a 
licence from the authorities was needed. The number of licences was limited 
and these were in general only given if the purpose of the loan was investments 
or activities related to exports. For the oil and shipping sectors a licence was not 
needed. The private sector was not allowed to buy foreign securities and 
foreigners' access to buy Norwegian securities was very limited as well.5 
 
                                                     
3The budget was announced together with the National Budget every fall. A revised credit budget was 
released together with the Revised National Budget in the following spring. 
4 A part of the credit policy that we will not discuss is the state banks. The government operated a 
total of 9 state banks that had been created to provide credit either to regions or to groups/causes that 
otherwise would have problems getting affordable credit in the private market like for instance 
students, fishermen and the agricultural sector. Most of these are still operated at present date. The 
most important state bank for ordinary households was one granting house mortgages (Husbanken), 
and it was a part of the home-ownership policy of the government. State banks were quite important 
as long as credit was rationed, but their role decreased some in relevance when the credit market was 
deregulated. See Norwegian Official Reports (1995) for a thorough report on the subject of state 
banks. 
5 Domestic residents could trade foreign securities on the so-called "switch market". This was not of 
great importance and it was closed in the middle of 1984. 
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Of the quantitative regulations, a) and c) were used to control the supply of credit 
from banks, while both banks and life insurance companies were affected by b).  
Through this the government secured a minimum demand for bonds in the bond 
market. The supply of bonds was also controlled by the authorities with 
quantitative limits for the issuing of bonds. d) was used actively to limit lending 
from finance companies and non-life insurance companies. 
 
Besides the regulation that was a part of the active credit policy, is also existed 
prudential regulation in the form of: 
• Capital requirements: Minimum requirement for the size of an institution's 
capital (share capital, reserve funds, retained earnings and subordinated debt) as 
a percentage of total liabilities (possibly deducted for the capital itself and some 
other assets - there were some changes over time). 
• Liquidity requirements: Minimum requirement for the size of an institution's 
liquid assets as a percentage of total liabilities. Liquid assets were defined 
basically in the same way as primary reserves. The main purpose was to secure 
that institutions were able to meet their short-term obligations. 
 
Neither of these requirements were of any importance before the end of the 1980s. 
The primary reserve requirements normally secured that the liquidity requirements 
were met as well, and the capital requirement was seldom binding. This is 
discussed more in Section 4. 
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3. The grey market 
Since credit regulations were concerned with regulating financial institutions, it 
existed an opening for an unregulated market (the "grey market"). In this market 
money was lent directly from one person to another, usually with finance brokers 
as intermediaries. Financial institutions were important agents in this market 
through the issuing of guarantees for loans, making a loan in the grey market less 
risky, and several firms also had departments that could act as grey loan brokers for 
their customers. 
 
The grey market is not well-documented in official reports, but a thorough 
description of the available data is found in Nyborg (1986). This paper discusses 
several aspects of the grey market, including how the market has developed over 
time and most importantly whether the grey market can be claimed to have been a 
"buffer", especially for the banks, acting as a cushion in times of contractionary 
credit policy. 
 
Attempts to measure the exact size of the grey market suffer from poor data 
availability, but there exist data on the volume of the guarantees issued by the 
financial institutions, and also on the loans brokered by finance brokers without 
guarantees (but these data have incomplete coverage). Based on this it seems like 
the market had a very modest size in the mid 70s, but it grew faster from around 
1979 (Norwegian Official Reports, 1983, Table 10A). According to Table 3.3.1 in 
Nyborg 1986, guaranteed loans plus other loans registered by brokers reached 10 
billion by the end of 1982, almost 14 billion by the end of 1984 and almost 18 
billion by the end of 1985. In 1984 this stock of grey loans was at about 4% of the 
total stock of loans from all financial institutions, ignoring the bond market.6 The 
real size of the market was probably somewhat larger, but nothing implies that the 
market had a substantial size. When it comes to the importance of the guarantees, 
Table 3.3.2 in Nyborg (1986) shows that as many as 70-80% of the loans were 
guaranteed around 1984.7 
 
When looking at the growth of grey market loans relative to bank loans, the 
conclusion in Nyborg (1986) is that, even though the movements mirror each other 
somewhat, the grey market was too small to serve as an important buffer. Hence, 
even though the grey market would most definitely have continued to grow had it 
not been for the deregulation of the ordinary credit market, its importance and the 
"damage" it caused the credit regulations should not be overstated. At the same 
time, one should not dismiss that the existence of a grey market could have had a 
psychological effect on policy makers, and possibly served as a motivation for the 
deregulation if some of them were convinced that the grey market neutralized 
many of the regulations.8  
                                                     
6 A similar development, but somewhat larger numbers are found in Norges Bank (1983b-1989b). 
These numbers suggest that the market (nominally) peaked in 1987 at more than 30 billion kroner, 
amounting to about 5% of the total assets of banks. 
7 The share was even larger prior to 1983, which was the year the government introduced regulation 
of such guarantees – see Section 4. 
8 See e.g. a letter from Norges Bank to the Department of Finance cited in Department of Finance 
(1983b), where it was argued that the grey market would seriously weaken the effects of credit 
regulations if it continued to grow. 
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4. Institutional development 
To fully grasp the extent of the regulatory changes that have taken place and also to 
acquire some information about how the government's instruments were used, this 
section will lead us chronologically through the period starting in 1970 and ending 
in 2008. The description has been divided into sub periods - mainly for 
expositional reasons - but to some extent the division also highlights which years 
that share common characteristics. 
1970-74: Fine-tuning the economy? 
Our description begins in 1970, which in many respects is a fine example of how 
credit planning was conducted. Early in the year total reserve requirements for all 
banks were increased temporarily, mainly to neutralise the liquidity effect of a 
change in the tax system (see Table A.59). Later, when the authorities saw that 
lending continued to grow stronger than planned, the total reserve requirement for 
commercial banks was increased several times throughout the fall. Furthermore, 
additional reserve requirements were put in place for commercial banks in the 4th 
quarter (additional requirements are summarised in Table A.6). The authorities also 
saw it necessary to limit lending from finance companies, and imposed maximum 
caps for their lending growth in the last three quarters (these companies would 
continue to face direct regulation the next two decades, see Table A.8 for the 
details). 
 
In 1971 the Bretton Woods system (an international system for fixed exchange 
rates) broke down, and exchange rate markets became very uncertain (Table A.11 
provides all the details regarding exchange controls and exchange rate regimes). 
The main effect in Norway was probably an increase in liquidity as agents sold 
foreign currency to minimize uncertainty. By the time of summer lending had 
grown fast, making the government increase the reserve requirements for both 
commercial and savings banks (this time primary requirements were used instead 
of total requirements - primary reserve requirements are summarised in Table 
A.310). That dampened the action somewhat, but the growth increased again later in 
the fall. However, this was judged by the authorities as driven by export-oriented 
companies' need to finance their increased inventories, and it was therefore deemed 
"acceptable". As in 1970 finance companies were given a limit for their growth in 
lending, but factoring companies were given a higher cap than others since they 
lend to businesses that need financing while they wait for payments. 
 
Norway joined the European exchange rate cooperation (the so-called "snake") in 
May 1972 and this brought more certainty regarding future exchange rates. Coming 
to the fall of 1972, lending from commercial banks had grown faster than the limits 
of the credit budget and their primary reserve requirement was increased. The 
savings banks started off the year with slow growth in lending, and their reserve 
requirement was therefore first cut, but then increased again as lending grew 
towards the summer and fall. 
 
The beginning of 1973 was also a period with strong growth in lending from 
commercial banks and in the spring an additional reserve requirement was put in 
place. It was removed in December, but this spurred a new increase in lending and 
commercial banks ended up exceeding the limits in the credit budget of 1973 by 
more than 20 percent. Savings banks had a more balanced development, but to 
avoid that increased lending from savings banks would neutralise the 
contractionary effect from the additional reserve requirement their primary reserve 
requirement was increased. 
                                                     
9 Total reserve requirements were not included in the list of instruments in Section 2 since they were 
removed already in 1974. 
10 Note that banks in the North (i.e. banks with their main office in one of the northernmost counties 
(Nordland, Troms and Finnmark) were given a lower reserve requirement. This is shown in Table 
A.4. 
  
Reports 37/2010 Credit regulations in Norway, 1970 - 2008
Statistics Norway 13
The growth in lending continued to be strong in 1974. However, in the spring it 
came to be expected that the banks would face something close to a liquidity crisis 
around June-July and the authorities chose to cut the primary reserve requirements 
in order to help out. At the same time it was given a strict message to the banks that 
they had to be careful with further growth in lending and that this was not an easing 
of credit policy. But lending from commercial banks continued to grow. This was 
possibly because they wanted to lend out as much as possible before they, as 
expected, were given an additional reserve requirement (a larger balance sheet 
would give higher nominal limits). This came in September, and their reserve 
requirement was also later increased as a strong krone had provided extra liquidity 
to the banking system. The savings banks' balance sheets continued to grow 
according to the credit budget, and their primary reserve requirement reached zero 
when the requirements were cut in June. 
 
In 1974 non-life insurance companies were put under direct regulation for the first 
time - their regulation was similar to what the finance companies were facing, see 
Table A.9. 
1975-77: Expansionary credit policy 
A downturn hit the international economy in 1975, but the Norwegian economy 
fared fairly well. This was partly due to the government's counter-cyclical policy in 
which one of the measures was an expansionary credit policy. Banks were 
encouraged to provide credit for export companies such that they could increase 
their inventories. The primary requirement for commercial banks was cut and it 
reached zero in June (it had been zero for savings banks since June 1974). The 
minimum fraction of total assets that banks were required to hold as bonds was also 
cut (see Table A.7 for all the info on placement requirements) and the permitted 
level of lending from the state banks and the size of the credit budget were both 
increased.11 Despite these measures lending grew only slightly and, as seen in 
Figure 1.1, total credit supply ended far below the limits of the budget. 
 
The expansionary credit policy continued into 1976, but towards the end of the 
year reserve requirements for both commercial banks and savings banks were 
increased again. This did not prevent total lending from exceeding the bounds of 
the credit budget. Furthermore, the large lending limits that had been given to state 
banks as a part of the counter-cyclical policy in 1975 (and parts of 1976) would 
continue to result in a high growth in lending from state banks the next years as 
well - due to the implementation lags. This probably had a stronger liquidity effect 
than what the government initially planned. 
Throughout 1977 loans from both types of banks continued to exceed the bounds 
of the credit budget and their reserve requirements were increased further. In 
addition, the placement requirements were tightened. Commercial banks saw a 
small cut in their reserve requirement at the end of the year in reaction to the 
liquidity situation that occurred because of some turbulence in the exchange rate 
markets. 
1978-79: Tightening of policy, but liberalised exchange controls 
A contractionary credit policy was introduced at the end of 1977 and during 
1978.12 To begin with, the interest rate norms were withdrawn (except for some 
types of mortgage loans) in December 1977, and it entailed that banks were 
permitted to freely charge any interest rate. The authorities wanted to generate a 
general increase in the interest rate level to make the real interest rate turn 
                                                     
11 As another part of the expansionary policy Norges Bank cut the discount rate. This was not 
followed up by a change in the interest rate norms, and can be seen as a change in policy where the 
ties between the discount rate and the interest rate norms were loosened. 
12 This policy was intended to reduce private consumption growth and to lower wage and price 
inflation in order to improve the competitiveness of the export industries. In addition to these 
measures the krone was devalued in February to improve competitiveness directly. 
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positive13 and thus curb total demand for credit. Further, the control of the interest 
rates on the bond market was relaxed considerably (but not the regulation of whom 
that could issue bonds). During the spring lending ceilings for state banks and 
private banks were reduced, the placement requirement for life insurance 
companies was increased and the government made the private banks agree to limit 
the amount that households were allowed to borrow for consumption purposes.14  
Reserve requirements for banks were reduced through the year, first to compensate 
for the liquidity withdrawal caused by a foreign exchange intervention by the 
central bank, and later because lending from the banks kept within the (already 
lowered) bounds in the credit budget (as seen in Figure 1.1). The requirements for 
both commercial and savings banks reached zero in August. As previously 
announced additional reserve requirements were put in place in May, mainly to 
make sure that loans for consumption purposes really were kept under control. 
Furthermore, Norges Bank sold for the first time their new short-term market 
papers (twice in August), and this withdrew even more liquidity ("unclassified" 
events such as this one are summarised in Table A.12). 
 
The contractionary credit policy became accompanied by a price and wage freeze 
introduced in September 1978. The freeze also covered interest rates, such that 
these were under government control again. The freeze lasted until the end of 1979, 
but the control of interest rates were to be kept and then re-formalised into interest 
rate declarations the fall of 1980 (see below). 
 
There was also a change in the exchange rate controls in 1978 and the effect was 
clearly liberalising, at least in the longer term. Before this banks had been given 
quantitative limits for their lending with institutions abroad. Now it was changed to 
a requirement that all authorised foreign exchange banks had to have an 
approximately zero total position (net spot and forward claims) at the end of every 
day. Hence lending abroad was unlimited for banks as long as their total position 
was close to zero. Initially this was only a trial system, but it was made permanent 
a few years later. This change had far-reaching consequences and has been claimed 
by some to have been one of the most important steps in the deregulation process 
(see Grønvik, 1994, p. 207). Banks could from now on borrow more extensively 
abroad and this weakened the traditional link between domestic deposits and 
domestic loans, reducing the authorities' ability to control the credit supply. 
 
Credit policy continued to be tight in 1979. The understanding between the 
government and the banks regarding loans for consumption purposes was revised, 
and they agreed on further reductions in consumption-motivating loans. A- and B-
loans were introduced as the new system for central bank loans to the banks. A-
loans were quite ordinary central bank loans, but B-loans were loans that came 
with very strict conditions almost mimicking additional reserve requirements. If a 
bank's quota for A-loans was spent, taking up B-loans was the only alternative (the 
system is described with more details in Table A.12). This gave the government 
another instrument to limit the growth in lending. 
 
In the beginning of the year, the authorities tried to apply only the new market 
papers from Norges Bank as their instrument to control liquidity. But despite a sale 
of market papers 5 times during the first 5 months of the year, lending grew faster 
than what was planned, and the reserve requirements were revived during the 
summer for both commercial and savings banks. Norges Bank offered to purchase 
back parts of the market papers they had sold (as a "compensation" for the higher 
reserve requirement), but the banks did not want to sell much, indicating that their 
liquidity situation was still quite good. When savings banks' lending continued to 
                                                     
13 The real interest rate had been negative most of the 70s. As one saw that net debt increased with 
income, this also had an undesirable distributional effect. 
14 The deal was to reduce this kind of loans by 2,000 mill. kroner during 1978. It was made effective 
by the fact that Norges Bank required the agreement to be followed if a bank was to get access to the 
automatic lending from the central bank. 
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grow, their reserve requirement was increased further and Norges Bank also made 
automatic lending to the banks temporarily more restrictive. Norges Bank once 
again offered to purchase market papers and this time savings banks used the 
option quite extensively. Also commercial banks' lending grew fast and it was 
planned to increase their reserve requirement. But after negotiations with the banks 
it was decided to sell market papers instead and the banks bought enough to 
produce the desired liquidity withdrawal. Later the savings banks were given the 
same possibility to "swap" parts of their reserve requirement for market papers, 
which they chose to do, and their requirement was lowered to a level neutralising 
the net effect on their liquidity from purchasing the market papers. The banks 
would get yet another possibility to avoid an increased reserve requirement if they 
bought enough market papers in October. In all these occasions the market papers 
were used much more actively than was planned when they were introduced two 
years before. In order to withdraw liquidity more permanently the placement 
requirement was increased for the banks in November. 
 
By the end of 1979, due to a combination of more restrictive access to loans from 
Norges Bank and a worsened liquidity situation, commercial banks representing 
nearly 9/10 of the sector's total assets had taken up the B-loans. This gave Norges 
Bank good control of their lending the next 6 months. Savings banks had not taken 
up B-loans to the same extent, but to change this Norges Bank temporarily 
suspended access to A-loans from November. Finance companies and non-life 
insurance companies were still under direct regulation, and the latter had their 
regulation-setup revised (see note in A.9). 
1980-81: Deregulating (and re-regulating) the bond market 
As in the late 70s, the government was aiming at keeping the growth in prices and 
costs low through 1980, and this required a tight credit policy. The foundation for 
this was already laid as many banks had to take up B-loans at the end of 1979. 
Furthermore, reserve requirements were increased (in the case of savings banks 
drastically) in January. Through the spring, lending kept within the bounds and the 
suspension of A-loans ended in March. 
 
Coming closer to the summer it was evident that banks needed more liquidity to 
meet their obligations. The authorities did not see it as necessary to get more banks 
in B-loan position yet, so they chose to cut the reserve requirements for both types 
of banks. The liquidity situation improved later in the summer and the authorities 
warned that reserve requirements would be increased if lending grew too fast. In 
both June and July new market papers were sold and this withdrew a lot of 
liquidity. But by the time of August, only 1 out of 4 commercial banks were still in 
B-loan position, and in July and August lending had started to grow more rapidly 
making the government increase the primary reserve requirements in September.15 
Access to A-loans was restricted for the period of September-October as an 
additional measure. The reduction in liquidity was partly neutralised since Norges 
Bank offered to purchase market papers from banks, as they had done earlier, but 
still the tightening was enough to put commercial banks representing 60% of their 
sector's lending in B-loan position by mid-September. The rest of the year it was 
mostly a need for making savings banks reduce their growth in lending, but since 
their primary reserve requirement had hit its legal maximum, the authorities 
attempted to keep the interest rate in the interbank market high through the use of 
currency swaps. In total the banks ended up exceeding their lending limits, despite 
heavy-handed use of instruments from the authorities. 
 
There were three other events in 1980 that are of particular interest. The first was 
that the banks agreed to offer 6,000 mortgages with better conditions than normal 
mortgages, so-called PSV-loans. This was a first step towards involving the banks 
                                                     
15 At this point, the Credit Law did not allow for a higher primary reserve requirement for savings 
banks (10%) while the limit for commercial banks (15%) was not yet reached. See Table A.3. 
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even more in financing the expansion of the housing stock, and as compensation 
the banks' lending bounds were increased by the same amount as all the PSV-loans 
in total.16 Secondly, the Minister of Finance began issuing interest rate declarations 
(see Table A.12) as a new form of administratively controlling the interest rate 
level for regular loans.17  
 
Lastly, from the 1st of October 1980, the regulation of bond issuing was 
liberalised. This was in principle a complete liberalisation of the supply side of 
bonds and private businesses as well as loan associations were free to issue as 
many bonds as they liked. The demand for bonds continued to be stimulated by the 
placement requirement, which was kept unchanged. The effect of the deregulation 
was, not surprisingly, a large increase in the flow of credit in the bond market, and 
it was stronger than what the government had envisaged. To reduce the demand for 
bonds the placement requirement for banks was cut in half at the end of the year, 
but the end result was still that the total flow of credit ended at a level almost 50% 
above the bounds of the credit budget. 
 
In 1981 it looked like bank lending turned more towards households and 
municipalities, probably because many firms got access to credit in the bond 
market. In the beginning of the year several banks were still in B-loan position, but 
the number declined through the first quarter. Since the authorities had given up 
most of the control of the bond market they had to focus even more on controlling 
the extension of regular loans. As a consequence additional reserve requirements 
were once again put in place in May for both commercial and savings banks. This 
time only repayment loans to municipalities, wage earners and self-employed were 
covered by the regulation. One month earlier, the reserve requirement for 
commercial banks had been cut to improve liquidity and to give commercial and 
savings banks the same reserve requirement. After the additional requirements 
were put in place, reserve requirements for both types of banks were reduced 
because of a seasonal pattern in the liquidity conditions. By the end of June a large 
part of commercial banks had taken up B-loans and this gave the authorities even 
more control. In the fall total lending did not grow too fast, but lending grew quite 
fast for the types of loans not covered by the additional requirements, so the 
reserve requirements were raised in November. This forced more banks to take up 
B-loans, but in total the banks still ended up exceeding their lending bounds for 
this year. 
 
In October 1981 the government saw it necessary to reintroduce some regulations 
in the bond market. Loan associations, who had been responsible of about half of 
the bonds issued from the private sector and municipalities the last 12 months, 
were denied to issue any new bonds the rest of the year. However, businesses were 
still free to issue bonds, making the market still more liberal than prior to 1980. 
1982: Awaiting changes 
The additional reserve requirements imposed in May 1981 were still in place when 
1982 started. To reduce the demand for bonds further, banks' placement 
requirement was cut another time. New regulations for the bond market were 
presented in March 1982, but these were far from as strict as those that existed 
prior to 1980, even though loan associations were kept under direct regulation. 
Hence, despite that the liberalisation from 1980 had been partly reversed, it is fair 
to say that deregulation of the bond market was well under way (see Table A.12 for 
details). The growth in lending was strong at the beginning of the year, and to 
withdraw liquidity Norges Bank used currency swaps and sold market papers 
during January. It was mostly the savings banks that were responsible for the 
                                                     
16 PSV is an acronym for the Norwegian sentence "På Spesielle Vilkår" which means "On Special 
Terms". The arrangement continued for several years, even though it is not mentioned explicitly later 
in the text. 
17 This was a formalisation of the control that had been kept after the price freeze ended in 1979. 
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strong growth in lending. The Credit Law did not allow for an increase in their 
primary reserve requirement, so to hinder further expansions the additional reserve 
requirements were revised to cover all types of loans and from now on only savings 
banks. Commercial banks were off the hook since one still had the chance to 
increase their reserve requirement if that was necessary. 
 
During the spring, the money market rate reached quite high levels. This reflected 
both an anticipation of future credit policy and also banks' unwillingness to take up 
B-loans even in a tight liquidity situation because of the strings attached to such 
loans. Reserve requirements were cut in May when the state's own transactions 
caused a liquidity-withdrawal, but they were increased back during the summer to 
dampen the growth in lending. From July the government eased the restrictions that 
accompanied B-loans somewhat, and this made more banks "accept" the B-loan 
conditions. During the fall many banks entered B-loan position, and this allowed 
the reserve requirement to be cur cut again for both types of banks in November. 
1983-85: Deregulation continues 
The additional reserve requirement for savings banks expired at the end of 1982 
and banks' placement requirement was cut in February 1983 to deregulate the 
demand for bonds further. More important, the regulation of loan associations was 
relaxed when the quantitative limits for bonds sold to the non-financial private 
sector were removed.18 In addition a new regulation was introduced in 1983. As 
already discussed in Section 3, an unregulated credit market based on direct loans 
between individuals had developed. Up until now, no regulations were designed to 
control the amount of credit in this market. In January 1983 this changed. From 
now on the guarantees that financial institutions issued for loans in the grey market 
were directly regulated. The guarantees could at the end of the year not have 
increased in real terms compared to the level in the 3rd quarter of 1982. With this 
the regulators were hoping to avoid that a tightening of ordinary credit only lead to 
a leak over to the grey market. 
 
Just as the year before, the government wanted to avoid a very high money market 
rate. At the same time it also desired to use only indirect instruments in the credit 
policy and this implied that a higher money market rate was necessary to dampen 
the growth in lending. One attempt to balance these two considerations was to sell 
market papers with an interest rate low enough to avoid too much of an effect on 
the money market rate, and this was done in January 1983. Still, towards the end of 
April the savings banks had exceeded their lending limits by a great amount, but 
the lending from commercial banks had stayed very close to the bounds (many of 
them were still in B-loan position). The government chose to let the former 
consideration dominate and used direct regulations to dampen growth, imposing an 
additional reserve requirement for savings banks in July. In addition the Minister of 
Finance issued a new interest rate declaration in June where the interest rate level 
was lowered.19 Since lending was under control the primary reserve requirement 
for savings banks was cut in July to the same as what commercial banks were 
facing (theirs was reduced a few months earlier). In July it was decided to suspend 
the B-loan system. The system was not as efficient as originally hoped for (see 
Table A.12). 
 
By the time of July commercial bank lending had started to grow quite fast and an 
additional reserve requirement was imposed. During the rest of the year the 
authorities spent their energy focusing on the money market rate, and used market 
papers and swaps to control liquidity in the desired direction. It is also worth noting 
                                                     
18 This made it easier to save money in the bond market. As previously noted, a well-functioning 
bond market would make it considerably simpler to limit the growth of the grey credit market. One 
was probably hoping to channel more private savings over the bond market instead of the grey market 
from now on. 
19 Furthermore finance companies involved in factoring or leasing were put under direct regulation. 
This was the first time leasing was regulated. See Table A.8 for the development. 
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that while the private sector (excluding those with a placement requirement) had 
bought almost no bonds before 1980, it was in 1983 purchasing bonds for more 
than 4 billion kroner. 
 
From the beginning of 1984 the additional reserve requirement for the commercial 
banks was removed, and this was actually intended to be a permanent removal of 
such direct regulations. For precautionary reasons the primary reserve requirements 
were increased at the same time. That the guarantees issued for loans in the grey 
market had been put under regulation (see description above) caused some 
difficulties for the task of controlling credit flows because loans that were 
previously in the unregulated market were moved to the banks' balance sheets. This 
made it hard to measure the real growth of credit. In any case, lending grew 
strongly in January, and then strong, but not dramatically strong, the next three 
months. The government saw it necessary to increase the reserve requirements in 
March. The trend was similar through the summer, and the requirements were 
raised again in September. At this point, the direct regulation of factoring and 
leasing had ended (see Table A.8), but both types of lending were given a reserve 
requirement instead (this requirement is shown in Table A.10). To avoid a too 
strong withdrawal of liquidity Norges Bank offered to purchase back the market 
papers bought by the banks in July. The strong growth in lending continued 
throughout the year, but no new measures were taken to dampen the growth, 
besides that Norges Bank sold market papers for more than 3 billion kroner in 
October. 
 
Several other changes occurred in 1984. Placement requirements were cut in the 
beginning of the year, and the bond market continued its healthy development from 
1984. Liberalisation of exchange controls took two new steps in June. First, mostly 
symbolically, the limit on how much currency a resident could purchase when 
going abroad was removed and also the limit on how much one could invest in 
foreign properties. Second, and more important, domestic residents were from now 
on allowed to invest as much as they wanted in foreign stock markets, but 
investments in non-listed stocks and in bonds were still regulated. In addition the 
licence requirement for direct investments in Norway was removed. But to reduce 
the supply of credit from abroad, foreigners' access to invest in bonds was 
withdrawn in November (earlier they could invest up to 1 mill. kroner). 
 
Liberalisation of the bond market continued in 1985. Up until then new bonds had 
a been required to have a minimum maturity of 12 months, but now certificates 
(bonds with a maturity up to 12 months) were allowed to be traded.20 Also, the 
placement requirement for banks was revoked from the 1st of January 1985, and it 
was set to zero for life insurance companies and pension funds at the same time 
(and subsequently revoked in July 1985). Furthermore, in February domestic 
residents and companies were permitted to invest in foreign bonds denominated in 
foreign currency (but only up to a limit of 1 mill. kroner for private residents and 
up to 5 mill. for companies). Two new steps came in the fall of 1985: In September 
the Minister of Finance stopped issuing interest rate declarations, and the interest 
rates were now floating freely. Furthermore, the requirement that domestic 
residents needed a license to take up loans abroad (through the foreign exchange 
banks) was also removed. 
 
Despite the deregulation the authorities had not given up the goal of keeping the 
growth in credit balanced, and the reserve requirements were increased in February 
1985 to dampen the growth in lending. This tightening was far from enough, and 
lending exceeded the bounds in the budget considerably by the end of April. The 
reserve requirement was increased again in July, but this can not be seen as a 
strong tightening since the basis of calculation for the requirement was changed at 
                                                     
20 At the same time government certificates were introduced, and this reduced the need for Norges 
Bank's market papers, and these were sold for the last time in January 1985. 
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the same time, and this counteracted much of the effect (see Table A.12). The rest 
of the year there was a surge in lending, and few contractive policies from the 
government.21 
1986-87: End to quantitative regulation of banks 
In 1986 the government stood ready to use their instruments to curb the growth in 
lending somewhat.22 The reserve requirement for both banks and financing 
companies were increased during the first quarter. Another tightening came when 
the basis of calculation for the reserve requirement was expanded somewhat. 
 
Despite previous intentions, an additional reserve requirement was given to both 
commercial and savings banks from early in the year, and it was tightened in the 
summer (see Table A.6). The reserve requirement for banks was reduced twice 
later in the year, probably because the use of the additional requirements gave 
enough control. A primary reserve requirement was introduced for life insurance 
companies in March, and it was increased further in June (see Table A.10). In 
January the direct regulation of the guarantees given by financial institutions in the 
grey market was reintroduced (the previous regulation had been removed in the 
second half of 1984). The guarantees were limited to stay below the level at the end 
of 1985. To accommodate this regulation, the licensing-process for guarantees 
given by foreign financial institutions was made very restrictive. However, all 
these attempts to in some way re-regulate the credit market could not stop the flow 
of credit from reaching a level more than twice the bounds of the credit budget 
(again, see Figure 1.1). 
 
In May, following a large fall in the oil price, the krone was devalued by 12 
percent. This was to be the last devaluation of the krone before it was allowed to 
float from December 1992 (the change in peg in 1990 was effectively not a 
devaluation). Around this period, banks were experiencing a rough liquidity 
situation,23 and the money market rate was very high. In response, Norges Bank 
changed its system for automatic lending and the system was updated several times 
the rest of the year (see Table A.12). 
 
The additional reserve requirement was kept from the start of 1987 (with a few 
minor changes) and the regulation of the guarantees was kept with no changes at 
all. On the other hand, more deregulation was under way. In June all the primary 
reserve requirements were revoked (besides that for finance companies which was 
revoked in October). Furthermore, the additional reserve requirement was removed 
the 9th of October, marking the complete removal of quantitative regulation of 
banks. 
 
The year of 1987 was also the last time the government "bothered" to put up a 
credit budget. The budget was abandoned from 1988, even though one could argue 
that the budget had been mostly symbolic the last few years.24 When the year 1987 
ended, there were very few regulations left. The guarantees issued by financial 
                                                     
21 At the time it was also suggested that some of the credit growth was caused by loans that were 
invested directly in various financial instruments, leading to an increase in the credit multiplier (a 
profitable activity due to a very favorable tax-treatment of debt and the returns from some assets). 
22 In May 1986 it was a change of government and the Labor party (Arbeiderpartiet) succeeded the 
center-right coalition lead by the Conservative party (Høyre). This did not change the credit policy 
drastically - as is noted in Ministry of Finance (1987b) the new government admitted that even though 
it disagreed with the choices of the former government, it was now too late to reverse the deregulation 
process. 
23 This was related to the fact that Norwegian banks found a large share of their funding abroad 
(Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, 1986). A discussion of changes in the banks' balance-
sheets over time would be an interesting supplement to this document. 
24 Instead of a credit budget the authorities started to announce a target zone for the desired level of 
credit growth. Every year a relatively wide zone for the planned growth in credit supplied to the 
private sector and municipalities would be spelled out, and the credit policy would be adjusted to 
keep the growth within the bands. This was far from as detailed as the credit budget. 
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institutions for loans in the grey market were still regulated, as was lending from 
private finance companies and non-life insurance companies. There were also 
bounds for the loan associations' lending for housing-purposes, primary industries 
and power plants. However, these last regulations were not given much more time 
and both were removed from the 1st of July 1988. It can be argued that this marks 
the completion of the deregulation. At the end of the year it was also made easier 
for companies to take up long-term loans denominated in foreign currency (Table 
A.11 has the details). 
The banking crisis 
From around 1987/88 to 1992/93, Norway suffered a major banking crisis. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) labels it as one of the world's "big five" banking crises 
in the post-war period. It forced many banks to close down and the government had 
to take over the ownership of some of the largest banks in Norway. In this section 
we will focus on some non-regulatory events, and return to regulatory changes in 
the next section. It will only give a brief sketch of the events and for more thorough 
presentations of the Norwegian banking crisis see e.g. Norwegian Official Reports 
(1992) or Moe, Solheim, and Vale (eds.) (2004).  
 
The first sign of weaknesses in the banking sector came in 1987 when the 
commercial banks (seen in total) suffered net losses for the first time in many 
years. This was caused by both an increase in losses on loans but also a stock 
market collapse in October. The Oslo Stock Exchange index dropped by more than 
40%, and this pushed it back to its levels of 1984/85. Gross losses for both 
commercial and savings banks had jumped from around 2,000 mill kroner in 1986 
to just below 4,500 mill kroner in 1987. The tendency of increasing losses for the 
banks continued in 1988. 5 banks saw their entire capital base being wiped out that 
year and total losses for commercial and savings banks increased to 8,700 mill. 
kroner. The commercial banks were still facing a net loss and savings banks' profits 
were close to negative. The losses of finance companies were also increasing 
rapidly. The Commercial Banks' Guarantee Fund had to, for the first time in many 
years, guarantee for all liabilities of a bank, the regional bank Sunnmørsbanken. 
 
In 1989 total losses for the banks amounted to 10,400 mill. kroner. It was 
especially the losses of savings banks that pushed the total up to its new level. 
However, net results were actually better than in 1988 and they turned positive for 
both types of banks as gains from the stock market gave a boost to revenues, but 
there were large differences within the sector. The commercial bank Norion Bank 
became, at the 30th of October 1989, the first bank since 1923 to be put under 
administration. It was later decided to liquidate the bank. Several other banks also 
struggled. Many failed and their remaining parts were in most cases merged with 
larger banks. Finance companies had suffered big losses over the last years, but 
total losses in 1989 were smaller than in 1988 (1,400 vs. 2,000 mill. kroner). Loan 
associations were still in an acceptable situation, but their losses had also started 
rising. 
 
The banking problems escalated in 1990, and the results of the banks were the 
worst since WWII. This is also the year it is commonly assumed that the banking 
crisis erupted. Both commercial and savings banks had net losses, and their total 
gross losses ended at more than 12 billion kroner. For commercial banks this 
amounted to a net profit of -0.77% of the average total assets. The sum of non-
accrual loans was almost as large as the total losses and this gave warning about 
difficult times ahead. Several banks had grave problems and were either guaranteed 
by the Commercial Banks' Guarantee Fund or the Savings Banks' Guarantee Fund 
and many near-failing banks were merged with others. Finance companies 
continued to lose money, but lost less than the year before. Loan associations also 
began to see larger losses, but continued to have a positive net result. The stock 
market peaked at a new record-high level in the beginning of August, only to drop 
again by almost a third by the end of the year. This made the financial situation for 
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banks even worse. There was also evidence indicating that the amount of loans 
over the grey market had been reduced drastically. 
 
Losses peaked in 1991. Banks faced total losses of almost 20 billion kroner. The 
Government Bank Guarantee Fund was established to provide loans to the two 
bank sectors' own Guarantee Funds such that they were able to prop up enough 
guarantees for all the banks that were in trouble. Later the fund was also allowed to 
invest directly in problem banks. To provide capital to relatively sound banks as 
well, The Government Bank Investment Fund was created to invest directly in 
banks on close to commercial terms. By 1992 it was clear that even though the 
losses had peaked in 1991, there were still problems remaining. The banking sector 
lost a total of roughly 12 billion kroner (i.e. still very large, but far less than in 
1991) and the savings banks actually made a net profit during the year. The banks 
that had been supported by the government in the crisis had been given clear 
requirements with respect to cutting administrative costs and reaching a positive 
net result as soon as possible. 1992/93 can be regarded as the last years of the 
banking crisis. In 1993 the banks' net results had improved a lot since 1992, both 
due to lower losses and gains from increasing asset values. Economic activity had 
started to pick up in Norway, and was expected to do so internationally as well. 
1988-93: Regulatory changes during the banking crisis 
After quantitative regulations had been removed the regulation that was left 
consisted mainly of the capital and the liquidity requirements (these are described 
in Section 2). Prior to the end of 1980s these requirements were not that important, 
as already noted. Primary reserve requirements normally made sure that liquidity 
requirements were met while capital requirements were seldom binding. Berg and 
Eitrheim (2009) argue that the regulators did not see it as necessary to enforce strict 
capital requirements in the 1970s and 80s. As a consequence, the capital 
requirement was relaxed on several occasions. In 1984 and 1987 changes were 
made to permit a larger share of a bank's capital to consist of subordinated debt, 
which in many cases was raised internationally (again, see Berg and Eitrheim 
(2009)). However, from 1988 and onwards, the capital requirement was to become 
the main regulatory instrument. 
 
An update of the capital requirements came in 1988 when it was decided to let 
savings banks be subject to the same requirement as what commercial banks had 
already faced for a long time.25 Table A.1 summarises all the changes in the capital 
requirements. Insurance companies were given one as well, but with a smaller 
percentage requirement. The liquidity requirement for banks was updated from the 
start of 1989 (see Table A.2). 
 
Even though the deregulation was basically finished, the liberalisation of capital 
flows continued in 1989. In May foreigners were again allowed to buy listed bonds 
in Norway and this time without any limits. In July the authorities gave domestic 
residents permission to buy shares in foreign securities funds. Finally, in December 
foreigners were allowed to issue bonds on the Norwegian bond market. The 
liberalisation was finalised in 1990 when a new set of foreign exchange regulations 
was presented, but the practical implications of this change were modest. 
Previously all transactions had to be explicitly permitted. From now on the premise 
would be the opposite: All transactions were permitted unless they were forbidden. 
Furthermore, the fixed exchange rate arrangement was changed in October and the 
krone was from now on pegged to the European Currency Unit (the "ecu"). This 
was mostly a formal change since kroner had been pegging Deutsche Mark 
informally, and for some time it did not affect the effective exchange rate at all. 
 
                                                     
25 The requirement was to keep the capital ratio at a minimum of 6.5% of total liabilities (minus the 
capital itself and some near risk-free assets). 
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A substantial change occurred in 1991 when the Basel Accord was implemented. 
This was a set of regulations worked out by the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), and represented a major step towards international coordination of bank 
regulation, even though some variation of requirements across countries were 
permitted. The most important change relative to the previous Norwegian rules was 
the system of putting weights on different assets according to their presumed 
riskiness when calculating a risk-weighted basis of calculation (to be used instead 
of total assets minus the capital itself), in addition to a requirement of consolidation 
within groups of financial companies. Mortgages were given a favourable risk-
weight of 50% provided that the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio was less than 80%. A 
bank's own capital would now have to be at least 8% of this risk-weighted basis of 
calculation. The rules were in some ways stricter than the old, for instance due to a 
consolidation requirement, but the risk-weighted capital requirement itself was 
slacker than the old (again, confer Berg and Eitrheim (2009)). The new rules were 
to be implemented gradually over the course of a few years.  
 
The tax system was reformed in 1992. One of the significant changes was a drastic 
reduction in the capital tax rate - the marginal rate was reduced from 40.5% to 28% 
while the average effective reduction was from around 34% to 28%. The effect was 
therefore a higher net-of-tax interest rate and possibly increased sensitivity for 
interest rate changes among households. 
 
The currency market was dominated by uncertainty and a panic through the fall of 
1992. In September the Finnish mark, which also had been pegged to the ecu, was 
put under huge pressure by speculators and the peg was left the 8th of September. 
The Swedish krona was the next target, and their peg was left the 19th of 
November. The turn came to the Norwegian krone and the 10th of December the 
krone was temporarily allowed to float, this too after a speculative attack. The 
system with a floating krone was made permanent from the 8th of January the 
following year. The monetary policy would still be concerned with keeping the 
exchange rate "stable" but not fixed. 
1994-99: Steady growth 
Norway joined the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994, and some minor 
adjustments were made to Norwegian rules such that they were in accordance with 
those of the EEA. The banking sector had resumed a condition of normality, and 
the credit authorities were happy with the development. All banks were by now 
fulfilling the capital requirements, and after a long period where the banks were in 
a net debt position versus Norges Bank, the situation was now the opposite. This 
was both because of changes in the general conditions, but Norges Bank also 
wanted this to happen to reduce their own exposure and risk and it had started to 
require collateral for the D-loans it extended. The result of the change in the net 
position of banks was that, contrary to earlier when the interest rate on D-loans had 
formed a lower bound in the interbank market, the sight deposit rate now formed 
the lower bound, while the D-loan rate formed an upper bound (see Table A.12). 
 
As a supplement to the capital requirements the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) 
was introduced in 1996.26 While the capital requirements that already existed were 
motivated by the desire to limit credit risk, CAD was meant to limit market risk. 
Financial instruments were given risk weights and then the weighted sum would 
form the basis of calculation for the extra capital requirement introduced (8% of 
the basis). This requirement came in addition to the already existing capital 
requirement and the capital used to cover the latter could not be used to cover the 
new one as well. The directive had a very modest effect. 
 
After the banking crisis, the Norwegian economy entered a period of strong 
economic growth, accompanied by strong growth in bank lending. The authorities 
                                                     
26 This directive was implemented in the whole European Economic Area. 
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judged that even though the capital requirements were fulfilled, core capital's share 
of the own capital was uncomfortably low, and they were also worried about the 
increasing share of mortgages extended with a very high LTV ratio.27 In 1998 two 
measures were taken to stop this. First, a house mortgage would only be given the 
50% risk weight if the LTV ratio was less than 60%. Secondly, banks would only 
be allowed to take up new subordinated debt with fixed maturity if their core 
capital was at least 7% of the basis of calculation for the capital requirement (this 
had already been informally practiced by Finanstilsynet). These two measures, 
together with a clear message to the banks about the need to tighten credit, 
dampened the credit growth in 1998. 
 
The Asian crisis affected both the Norwegian stock exchange and the value of the 
krone. The main stock index dropped by 40% in October 1998, and the krone was 
heavily depreciated. Still, the economy did not receive any severe shocks, and 
growth continued through both 1998 and 1999. 
2000-08: Basel II and international crisis 
The decade started off dramatically with the burst of the dot-com bubble in the fall 
of 2000 and the 9/11-attacks in 2001. Both events lead to falling stock indices 
world-wide and weaker growth internationally. Still, the Norwegian economy fared 
fairly well. Not as dramatic, but still of some interest, regulations kept on changing 
too. An updated Capital Adequacy Directive was implemented in 2000 (CAD-II). 
In 2001 the risk-weight for house mortgages with an LTV ratio between 60 and 
80% was set back to 50%, as the change in 1998 was meant to be temporary. An 
important change in monetary policy came in March 2001 as inflation targeting 
was introduced. Some form of implicit inflation targeting had already been 
conducted for a few years, but this marks an important shift in policy. 
 
The Norwegian economy suffered a minor downturn around 2003, mostly due to a 
combination of high interest rates (a tight monetary policy to fight inflation), with a 
very strong krone as a result and thus weak export prospects, and a fall in oil 
investments. It did not affect the banking sector to any large degree. 
 
In the mid 2000s we were also witnessing an increase in both the availability and 
popularity of so-called "flexible mortgages". These are home equity credit lines 
that allow home-owners with a low LTV ratio to increase the debt secured in their 
house and keep the fresh money as a "credit line" they can draw on - sort of a 
cheap credit card with your house as security. This has made housing wealth much 
more liquid. 
 
The latest regulatory change came in 2007 with new capital requirements based on 
the Basel II Accord. This accord was much more complex and detailed than its 
predecessor. For all the details, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2004). The Accord can be divided into three subcategories, or pillars. The first 
pillar is concerned with the capital requirements - the equivalent to the old Basel 
Accord, but with some new and important features. Among these was the 
possibility for institutions to use their own risk models to calculate their capital 
requirement (so-called Internal Ratings Based). For those without their own model 
it was still a standard system for risk-weights assigned to different assets, much 
like the old system, but for mortgages with an LTV below 80% the risk-weight was 
reduced from 50% to 35%. Furthermore, house mortgages with a greater LTV and 
other commercial loans (up to some maximum limit) were given a risk-weight of 
75%. The second pillar covered the rules regarding the supervisory review process. 
Lastly, the third pillar contains regulations to ensure market discipline through 
disclosure requirements. A detailed description of the Accord is beyond the scope 
of this document, but for our purpose it's important to at least note that one 
                                                     
27 The core capital is mainly the share capital, reserve funds, retained earnings and primary capital. 
That this ratio was low meant that a large part of the banks' capital consisted of subordinated debt, a 
less stable way of funding. 
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important effect of the new rules was a reduced capital requirement for most 
financial institutions (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, 2007), mostly 
due to the changes within the first pillar. 
 
When the credit crunch began around the summer of 2007 the Norwegian financial 
markets were not affected that much. Norwegian banks had a relatively small 
exposure to sub-prime mortgages in the US. When the world economy was thrown 
into the financial crisis in the fall of 2008, the situation naturally got worse in 
Norway as well, but no domestic banks got into any grave problems. As many 
banks relied on lending abroad, both Norges Bank and the government had to step 
up with extra-ordinary measures to secure liquidity, and this helped calm the 
situation. The fall of 2008 deserves, just as the banking crisis, a much more 
extensive treatment than the one given here, but that would be outside the focus of 
this report. 
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5. Final comments 
As already noted, this report serves as a background paper for Krogh (2010), which 
estimates a preliminary credit conditions index for Norway using the framework 
and methodology of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006). In that setting 
qualitative information regarding the institutional development is essential since 
any sensible estimate of such an index should match the historical facts. This 
document provides some evidence for what one should expect of the index. 
 
There exist some other studies which look at the process of financial deregulation. 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) contains a wide survey of how financial 
liberalisation has taken place in 28 different countries, including Norway. The 
authors distinguish between the liberalisation of the capital account, the domestic 
financial system and stock markets. Periods are labelled as either repressed, 
partially liberalised or fully liberalised regimes. In their composite index (taking all 
three measures into account) the Norwegian financial market was partially 
liberalised from September 1985, and fully liberalised from January 1988. This fits 
well with the information presented here. 
 
If a credit conditions index proves useful for empirical purposes, a qualitative 
description as that found here will be of interest in the future as well. The 
description should therefore be both extended and updated when time comes. There 
is no reason to believe that regulation of financial markets will remain statically at 
present standards. The financial crisis has highlighted that there might exist 
regulatory flaws and a lot of work is in progress to improve the current framework. 
Some preliminary proposals are have already been published by BIS (Basel 
Committee on banking Supervision, 2009, 2010). 
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Appendix A: Tables 
Table A.1. Capital requirements 
The requirements for commercial banks, savings banks, finance companies and loan associations. 
Up until 1988 Commercial banks: A bank's capital had to be at least 6.5% of its total liabilities minus the capital itself and also minus 
some near risk-free assets. Finance companies and loan associations: A company's capital had to be at least 10% of 
the sum of its loans and guarantees issued. Savings banks: No capital requirements. 
 
Capital was defined as share capital, supplementary capital and allowances for possible loan losses. As pointed out in 
Berg and Eitrheim (2009), commercial banks did not fulfil their capital requirement until after 1972, and this happened 
just because the requirement was made slacker this year (prior to 1972 the requirement was 8% and one did not 
subtract anything from total liabilities when calculating the requirement). Later the capital requirement was relaxed on 
several occasions and in 1984 and 1987 changes were made to permit a larger share of a bank's capital to consist of 
subordinated debt. From 1984 the authorities accepted subordinated debt as a part of the bank capital up to 50% of 
bank equity. From 1987 the limit was set to 100%, conditional on half of this being perpetual bonds (Berg and 
Eitrheim, 2009). 
June 1988 Savings banks were given the same requirement as what commercial banks were facing. The requirement would be 
gradually imposed until the end of June 1992.  
April 1991 New set of regulations (based on Basel I) implemented. The main points were the following: Any financial institution's 
own capital was defined as the sum of its core capital, supplementary capital and allowances for possible loan losses. 
The core capital consisted of share capital, reserve funds, retained earnings and primary capital. The supplementary 
capital consisted of its subordinated debt, allowances for write-ups and tax-conditional provisions. The supplementary 
capital can not be greater than the core capital. Furthermore, subordinated debt with a fixed maturity can not exceed 
50% of the core capital. These limitations were supposed to secure a minimum level of quality of the own capital. The 
capital requirement was based on a risk-weighted basis of calculation. Assets were given a weight of either 0%, 20%, 
50% or 100%. For instance, claims on governments from within the OECD-area had a weight of 0%. House 
mortgages with a loan-to-(conservative)-value ratio of less than 80% had a weight of 50%. Most other loans, like a 
regular loan to a business got a 100% weight. Some posts that were not on the bank's balance sheet were also 
included in the basis of measurement. The capital requirement was that any financial institution's own capital had to 
be at least 8% of the basis of calculation. The new rules also contained requirements for consolidation of the accounts 
when one financial firm owns (parts of) another.  
June 1992 The definition of a financial institution's own capital was updated. It was now defined as a firm's core capital, 
supplementary capital and general reserve allowances. The latter term was a little bit broader than the term used 
previously (allowances for possible loan losses). Furthermore, supplementary capital was limited to be no greater than 
the sum of the core capital and the general reserve allowances. Subordinated debt with fixed maturity could not 
exceed 50% of the sum of the core capital and the general reserve allowances. 
March 1996 The categories for the different risk weights were updated. Just minor changes. 
December 1996  The Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) was implemented. This was an extra capital requirement which was meant to 
limit the market risk of financial institutions. The components of an institution's market portfolio were given risk 
weights, and the weighted sum formed the basis of calculation. An institution's own capital would have to be at least 
8% of the basis of calculation. This requirement came in addition to the already existing capital requirement (i.e., the 
same capital could not be used to cover both requirements). 
July 1998 House mortgages with a loan-to-value between 60 and 80% got an increased risk weight (from 50 to 100%).  
August 1998 To make the banks increase the core capital's share of their own capital, they would now only be permitted to take up 
new subordinated debt with fixed maturity if their core capital was at least 7% of the basis of calculation for the capital 
requirement (they would potentially accept ratios down to 6.5% as well, but only if the institution in question met with 
very strict criteria).  
June 2000  A new Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD-II) was implemented. The new regulations included details for how to handle 
positions in commodity-related contracts. It also opened up the opportunity for institutions to use their own Value-at-
Risk (VaR) models to calculate their reserve requirement, under the condition that their model was approved by 
Finanstilsynet.  
March 2001 The change from August 1998 was formalised to the following: Banks would, as a main rule, not be allowed to take up 
subordinated debt with fixed maturity unless their core capital equals at least 7% of the basis of calculation for the 
capital requirement. A core capital coverage down to 6% could be sufficient, but that was up to the Finanstilsynet to 
decide on a case-by-case basis.  
April 2001 House mortgages with a loan-to-value ratio between 60 and 80% were given back their 50% risk weight (confer the 
change in July 1998).  
January 2007 The Basel II Accord was implemented. For the full-blown description of BIS, see Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision (2004). The Accord can be divided into three subcategories, or pillars. The first pillar is concerned with 
the minimum capital requirements. This was the equivalent to the old Basel Accord, but with some new and important 
features. Among these was the possibility for institutions to use their own risk models to calculate their capital 
requirement (so-called Internal Ratings Based). For those without their own model, there was still a standard system 
for risk-weights assigned to different assets, much like the old system, but for mortgages with an LTV below 80% the 
risk-weight was reduced from 50% to 35%. Furthermore, house mortgages with a greater LTV and other commercial 
loans (up to some maximum limit) were given a risk-weight of 75%. The second pillar covered the rules regarding the 
supervisory review process. Lastly, the third pillar contains regulations to ensure market discipline through disclosure 
requirements. It is not realistic to give a good description of the Accord in this document, but for our purpose it's 
important to at least note that one important effect of the new rules was a reduced capital requirement for most 
financial institutions (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, 2007), mostly due to the changes within the first pillar. 
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Table A.2. Liquidity requirements after May 1989* 
Requirement for commercial and savings banks.  
May 1989  A bank's liquid assets (notes and coins, deposits at Norges Bank, deposits in the Postal Giro and the Post Office 
Savings Bank (two state banks), Norwegian treasury notes and bonds, plus government guaranteed bonds (not 
including those bonds used to cover the capital requirements)) had to be at least 8 of its total liabilities.  
November 1991  Liquidity requirement reduced to 6 of total liabilities.  
September 1995  The definition of liquid assets was expanded to also include the smallest of either 1) A bank's access to D-loans, 
minus the loans taken up, or 2) The assets deposited at Norges Bank as collateral for D-loans, minus the loans taken 
up.  
January 1999  The definition of liquid assets was changed: instead of including the smaller of the two alternatives specified in 
September 1995, one now included the collateral provided to Norges Bank for D-loans minus the D-loans the bank 
had.  
July 2006  The quantitative liquidity requirement was removed. Instead all financial institutions were required to "always have 
enough liquid assets to cover their liabilities when due". If Finanstilsynet finds that the liquidity risk in a company is too 
large it can impose special requirements.  
*There were liquidity requirements before May 1989 as well, but these were not of particular importance as we also had the various reserve requirements in 
place. 
Table A.3. Primary reserve requirements for banks in the south 
% of total assets that had to be held as primary reserves (deposits in Norges Bank, deposits in the Postal Giro and the Post Office Savings 
Bank (two state banks), Treasury Notes, and notes and coins).  
“.” implies no change. The number in parenthesis is the requirement for banks with less than 1 billion kroner in total assets.  
Date Commercial Savings Date Commercial Savings Savings 
Pre 1970  0 0 09.12.1977 7  .  . 
01.02.1970 4  .  01.01.1978 4  5  5 
21.04.1970 0  .  01.06.1978 3  3  3 
01.07.1971  .  3 01.08.1978 0  0  0 
01.08.1971 4 3.5 01.06.1979  .   3  3 
01.09.1971  .  4 05.07.1979 3  .  . 
01.10.1971 5  .  15.08.1979  .   9  9 
01.12.1971 6  .  16.10.1979  .   3  3 
01.02.1972  .  3 14.01.1980 6  10  10 
01.04.1972  .  0 01.06.1980 5  8  8 
01.09.1972  .  3 01.09.1980 13  10  10 
01.10.1972 7  .  01.04.1981 10  .  . 
01.11.1972 8  .  15.05.1981 8  8  8 
01.06.1973  .  4 16.11.1981 10  10  10 
17.09.1973  .  5 01.05.1982 8  8   8  
01.04.1974  .  4 01.07.1982 12 8.5 8.5 
01.06.1974 6 0 01.11.1982 8  6   6  
14.10.1974 8(.)  .  01.01.1983 7  7  7 
17.02.1975 6(4)  .  01.04.1983 4  .  . 
01.04.1975 5(3)  .  01.07.1983  .   4  4 
01.06.1975 4(0)  .  01.01.1984 5  5  5 
20.06.1975 0(.)  .  05.03.1984 7  7  7 
01.07.1976 3.5  .  01.09.1984 10  10  10 
10.08.1976  .  2.5 01.02.1985 11  11  11 
15.09.1976 4.5  .  01.07.1985 15  15  15 
15.11.1976  .  3.5 01.02.1986 17  17  17 
17.01.1977 5.5 4.5 01.06.1986 10  10  10 
16.05.1977 6.5 5.5 15.12.1986 5  5  5 
01.07.1977 8 6 01.06.1987  Revoked   Revoked  Revoked 
01.11.1977 9 7     
Notes: 
"South" means that the institution does not have its main office in the North: see note in Table A.4 for the definition of North. 
Note for 1978: In July the basis of calculation was changed in order to improve Norwegian banks' competitiveness: Loans in foreign currency extended after the 
1st of July 1978, pursuant to a Norwegian currency licence to either domestic or foreign agents, is taken out of the basis. 
Note for 1982: In June the basis of calculation was changed. Loans in kroner to the oil sector extended after the 7th of May 1982 was taken out of the basis. 
Note for 1985: In the middle of the year the basis of calculation for the reserve requirement was changed; from now on only drawn loans and credit in the form 
of bonds or certificates to businesses, individuals or municipalities would matter. This meant that for instance government bonds and state certificates were 
taken out of the basis. Considered separately, this would work just as a reduced reserve requirement. 
Note for 1986: The basis of calculation for the reserve requirement was changed again; now the loans to loan associations were included as well. 
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Table A.4. Primary reserve requirements for banks in the north 
% of total assets that had to be held as primary reserves (deposits in Norges Bank, deposits in the Postal Giro and the Post Office Savings 
Bank (two state banks), Treasury Notes, and notes and coins).  
“.” implies no change.  
Date Commercial Savings 
Pre 1970  0  0  
01.02.1970 3 . 
21.04.1970 0 . 
01.07.1971  .   3  
01.08.1971 4 3.5 
01.09.1971  .   4  
01.10.1971 .  2  
01.04.1972  .   0  
01.10.1972 5 . 
01.11.1972 6 . 
01.02.1974 0 . 
01.06.1987  Revoked   Revoked  
Notes: 
”North” means that the institution has its main office in one of the three northernmost counties; Nordland, Troms or Finnmark. This geographic discrimination 
was a part of the district policy. 
Table A.5. Total reserve requirements for banks 
% of total assets that had to be held as total (primary (i.e. deposits in Norges Bank, deposits in the Postal Giro and the Post Office Savings 
Bank (two state banks), Treasury notes and notes and coins) + secondary (government bonds and government guaranteed bonds)) 
reserves. 
Date Commercial Savings 
Pre 1970  12 (11) 18 (16) 
01.01.1970 .............................13 (12) . 
01.02.1970 .............................14 (13)  .  
21.04.1970 .............................13 (12)  . 
01.08.1970 .............................14 (13)  .  
11.09.1970 .............................15 (14) . 
15.10.1970 .............................16 (15)  .  
01.09.1974 .............................  Revoked   Revoked  
Notes: 
For commercial banks, the number in parenthesis is the requirement for banks with less than 1 billion kroner in total assets. For savings banks it is the 
requirement for banks with between 10 and 50 million kroner in total assets, while savings banks with less than 10 million kroner did not have a requirement. 
Note that even though these requirements were revoked in 1974, the primary reserve requirements were kept for 13 more years. 
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Table A.6. Additional reserve requirements for banks 
Direct regulation of banks' growth in lending (contrary to primary requirements which were indirect instruments). Each bank got a limit for 
future growth and if exceeded it had to put additional reserves on an account in Norges Bank. 
November 1970  Only for commercial banks. A bank with more than 500 mill. kroner in total assets could not increase its lending 
compared to the level 12 months before with more than 9% by the end of December 1970, 8.5% by the end of January 
1971 and 8% by the end of March 1971 and onwards. If it had less than 500 mill. kroner in total assets, the limits were 
13% by the end of December 1970, 12% by the end of January 1971, 9% by the end of April 1971 and 8% by the end of 
May 1971 and onwards. If limits were exceeded the bank had to keep 50% of any further growth in lending as an 
additional reserve. This requirement was in effect until mid-1971.  
May 1973  Only for commercial banks. A bank in the South with more than 2,000 mill. kroner in total assets could not increase its 
lending compared to the level 12 months before with more than 11% by the end of May, 10% by the end of June and 
9.5% by the end of July and onwards. A bank in the south with less than 2,000 mill. kroner in total assets had limits 
equal to 14%, 11% and 9.5%. If the limits were exceeded, 50% of any further growth had to be kept as an additional 
reserve. Banks in the north got a little bit slacker requirements. This regulation was in effect until the December the 
same year.  
September 
1974  
Only for commercial banks. Lending could not increase, compared to the level by the end of July 1974, with more than 
3%. If the limit was exceeded, 50% of any further growth had to be kept as an additional reserve. Lasted until the end of 
the year.  
May 1978  For both commercial and savings banks. The limits varied for different banks, with positive discrimination for banks in the 
North and for specific types of loans. Among the loans excepted was house mortgages. Lasted until the end of the year.  
May 1981  For both commercial and savings banks. Only repayment loans to municipalities, wage earners and self-employed were 
regulated and could increase with 9% percent compared to the permitted level 12 months before. Controls started the 
30th of September, and afterwards every month. Ended in March 1982  
March 1982  Only for savings banks. The first control was in the end of June, and banks in the South (North) were allowed to increase 
their lending with 12% (16%) compared to the level 12 months before. The limits were gradually decreased until October 
when the limits were 8% (12%). Lasted until the end of the year.  
June 1983  Only for savings banks. The first control was in the end of September, and banks in the South (North) could increase 
their lending with 14% (16%) compared to lending 12 months before. The limits were linearly reduced until December 
when the limits were 11% (13%). Lasted until the end of the year.  
July 1983  Only for commercial banks. The first control was in the end of September, and banks in the South (North) could increase 
their lending with 13.5% (17.5%) compared to lending 12 months before. The limit was linearly reduced until December 
when the limits were 10.5% (14.5%). Lasted until the end of the year.   
January 1986  For both commercial and savings banks. The first control was in the end of March. The basis of calculation for the 
requirement was a function of the different types of loans covered by the basis of calculation for the primary reserve 
requirements. For every bank the average of these loans in June, July and August 1985 would form the basis. In 
addition the average of the total growth in the banking sector for these types of loans in the period of June, July and 
August until end of December 1985 was added to the basis for every bank. Banks could increase their lending with 10% 
compared to the basis. For growth within the limits, 10% of it had to be put on an account in Norges Bank. For further 
growth the requirement was 20%. The plan was to let the requirements last until the end of the year  
June 1986  An update of the latest requirement: For growth in lending up to 8%, 15% of the growth had to be put on an account in 
Norges Bank. For further growth the requirement was 25%.  
January 1987  It was decided to keep additional reserve requirements imposed one year ago. The only change was the basis of 
calculation. It was still based on the lending forms covered by the basis of calculation for the primary reserve 
requirements. For every bank, 122% of the average of these loans in June, July and August 1985 would form the basis. 
Other than that, the regulation was similar, and the limits were the same as the updated ones that came in June 1986.  
June 1987  The regulation from January was revised; building loans with conversion were taken out of the basis of calculation. The 
basis of the requirements would from now on be 129% of the average of the basis of calculation for primary 
requirements and outstanding building loans, at the end of June, July and August 1985. From this total, the outstanding 
building loans from the end of 1986 were subtracted. For a growth in lending up until 8 compared to the basis, 10% of 
the growth had to be put on an account in Norges Bank. For further growth the requirement was 25%. In July the basis 
was raised by 10%, and the limit was raised from 8% to 13%. The additional reserve requirements were revoked from 
the 9th of October 1987.  
Table A.7. Placement requirements 
% of growth in total assets that had to be invested in bonds (the placement requirement), up until the fraction of total assets held as bonds 
reached a certain ceiling (the max fraction).  
“.” implies no change.  
 Commercial and savings banks Life insurance companies and pension funds 
Date Placement req. Max fraction Placement req. Max fraction 
Pre 1970  33 30 0 0 
01.01.1970  .   .  40 60 
09.05.1975  .  23  .   .  
01.07.1976  .  25  .   .  
21.01.1977 35 27 50  .  
12.04.1978  .   .  60  .  
30.11.1979 60 30  .   .  
31.12.1980 30  .   .   .  
01.01.1982 20  .  40  .  
28.02.1983 15  .   .   .  
01.01.1984 0  .  30  .  
01.01.1985  Revoked   Revoked  0  .  
01.07.1985  .   .   Revoked   Revoked  
Notes: It was one difference between the requirement for commercial banks and that for savings banks. The latter type had a higher ceiling (40%) in the period 
up until the 2nd of March, 1973. From then they faced the same requirements. 
Note for life insurance companies and pension funds: Pension funds were actually given placement requirements already in 1969, while life insurance 
companies had an informal deal for a placement requirement with a lower rate. Starting from the 1st of January 1970 the requirements were the same. 
As well as with reserve requirement, there were some exceptions for institutions in the North, but these are not shown explicitly in the table. From the 1st of July 
1971, banks in the North had their requirement cut to 15%, and from the 1st of January 1972, life insurance companies and pension funds had theirs cut to 20%. 
From the 1st of January 1982, the rates were 10 and 20%, respectively. In 1983, it was cut to 5% for banks. Beginning in 1984 it was set to zero for banks and 15% 
for life insurance companies. When the requirements were removed for banks in the South, the requirements were removed for those in the North as well. 
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Table A.8. Regulation of finance companies 
% growth in lending permitted. For each year these were cumulative limits, i.e. the limit for the 4th quarter was the permitted growth for the 
entire year. The limit for the 2nd quarter was similarly the permitted growth for the first half of the year. If limits were exceeded punishment 
interests had to be paid to Norges Bank. 
"-" implies that the quantity in that specific quarter was not regulated (but the whole year can still have been regulated). The number in 
parenthesis was the limit for factoring companies when it differed from the general limit. Leasing was usually not regulated. See note below. 
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Compared to 
1970  -  8 8 8  The level 31/3-70   
1971  -   -   -  11 (20)  B  
1972 12 (25) 12 (25) 12 (25) 12 (25)  The level permitted in 1971  
1973 9 (20) 9 (20) 9 (20) 9 (20)  A  
1974 9 (20) 9 (20) 9 (20) 9 (20)  A  
1975 10 (22) 10 (22) 10 (22)  -   A   
1976 13 (22) 13 (22)  -   -   C  
1977  -/2 (3)   -/4 (6)   -/6 (9)  9 (13)  C/D  
1978  -   -   -  2.5  C  
1979  -   -   -  2.5  Permitted lending 12 months before  
1980  -   -   -  4.5  C  
1981  -  6 (15) 6 (15) 5 (14)  C  
1982  -   8/4 (-)   8/8 (-)   8/8 (-)   C/D  
1983  -   8/4 (-)   -   8/8 (-)   C/D  
1983  Factoring:  -  12 12  Either factoring lending at the end of 1982 or factoring lending 12 months before.  
1983  Leasing:  -  45 45  Either leasing lending at the end of 1982 or leasing lending 12 months before.  
1984  8/4 (10)   8/4 (10)   8/8 (-)   8/8 (-)   C/D  
1984 Leasing:  10  -   -   Leasing lending at the end of 1983.  
1985  8/4 (-)   8/4 (-)   10/10 (-)   10/10 (-)   C/D  
1986  10/5 (-)   10/5 (-)   10/10 (-)   10/10 (-)   C/D  
1987  10/5 (-)   10/5 (-)   10/10 (-)      C/D  
1987       10(-)  The largest of the lending at the end of the 4 different quarters in 1986.  
1988 10(-) 10(-)  Revoked   -  The largest of the lending at the end of the 2 different quarters the first half of 1987. 
Notes:  
A, B and C refers to various ways used to calculate permitted growth: 
A: The stock of loans 12 months earlier. 
B: The stock of loans at the end of the previous year. 
C: The smallest of actual and permitted stock of loans 12 months earlier. 
D: The smallest of actual and permitted stock of loans at the end of the previous year. 
The two types of loans "leasing" and "factoring" were given special treatment: Leasing was in general not regulated; the table is explicit about it when leasing is 
regulated. Factoring often got slacker limits; the number in parenthesis gives the limit for factoring companies when this is not the same as for other forms of 
lending. Starting in mid 1984, both types were regulated through the use of primary reserve requirements instead. See Table A.10 for this development. 
For the last two quarters of 1985, the companies could alternatively increase their lending with 10 mill. kroner compared to lending 12 months before or lending 
at the end of last year, if this was more than what the percentage limit permitted them. A similar option was given the next years. In 1986 the limit was a growth 
of 5 (2.5) mill. compared to lending 12 months before (or the end of last year) in the first two quarters, and 5 (5) mill. the last two quarters. In 1987 the sums 
were 7 (3.5) mill. in the first two quarters and 7 (7) in the last two. In the two first quarters of 1988 the limit was 15 mill. kroner compared to the largest of the 
lending at the end of the 2 first quarters in 1987. 
Note for 1977 and 1982-87: The companies could choose to keep within x/z% growth compared to C/D. 
Note for 1978: Starting the 1st of January 1978, private financing companies had to obtain a licence to be permitted to continue their business. 
Note for 1979: The reason for using permitted instead of actual lending when calculating the growth was because the financing companies agreed to lend out 
much less than their limits in 1978 to limit borrowing for consumption purposes. 
Note for 1983: The two extra lines for factoring and leasing were special regulations that were announced at the same time as the additional reserve 
requirements for banks (see Table A.6) and overrules the previous regulations. 
Note for 1987: Starting in the 3rd quarter, controls are now monthly, not just quarterly. 
Note that very small companies were exempted from all these limits. 
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Table A.9. Regulation of non-life insurance companies 
% growth in lending permitted. These are cumulative limits, i.e. the limit for the 4th quarter in any given year is the permitted growth for the 
entire year. The limit for the 2nd quarter is similarly the permitted growth for the first half of the year. If limits are exceeded, punishment 
interests have to be paid to Norges Bank. 
"-" implies that the quantity in that specific quarter is not regulated (but the whole year can still be regulated). 
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Compared to 
1974  -  6 6 6  A  
1974  -   -  14 9  (An update)  
1975 4 6 6 8  B  
1975  -  8 10 10  (An update) 
1976 6 9 12 12  D  
1976  -   -   -  40  The growth in total assets during 1975 (An alternative to the last regulation) 
1977  -  6  -  11  D  
1978  -  5  -  5  D  
1979  -  3  -  4.5-6.75  D  
1980  -  3  -  6 -12  D  
1981  -   -   -  6 -18  D  
1982  -   -   -  6 -24  D  
1983  -   -   -  2.5-12.5  D  
1984  -  2.2-11  -  4 -20  D  
1985  -  2.5-12.5  -  5 -25  D  
1986  -  2.5-12.5  -  5 -25  D  
1987  -  2.5-12.5  -  5 -25  D  
1988  -  2 -10  Revoked   -   D  
Notes: 
A, B and D refers to various ways used to calculate permitted growth: 
A: The stock of loans 12 months earlier 
B: The stock of loans at the end of the previous year 
D: The smallest of actual and permitted stock of loans at the end of the previous year. 
Note for 1976: The second row for 1976 was an alternative regulation that came in June 1976; the companies could choose which of the two to follow. 
Note for 1979: The rules were revised in 1979 and the limits from 1979Q4 and on are given as bands. The novelty is that, in addition to a `static' rule of a given 
percentage growth in lending every year, a `dynamic' term is added. Every company would now be allowed to increase lending by a given percentage of the 
average growth in premium income the last 4 years, in addition to the growth permitted by the static rule. This dynamic term was limited to be no greater than a 
given constant times the static rule. Hence companies ended up with a band of possible permitted levels. 
Table A.10. Primary reserve requirements for finance companies (only leasing and factoring) and life insurance companies (in 
the south) 
% of total assets that had to be held as primary reserves 
“.” implies no change 
Date Finance Life insurance 
Pre 1970   *   * 
01.09.1984 7  * 
01.02.1985 11  *  
01.02.1986 14  *  
01.03.1986  .  2.5 
15.06.1986  .   5  
01.06.1987 9  Revoked  
15.10.1987  Revoked   .  
Notes: 
Private financing companies could not be given a reserve requirement before 1984, but a change in the Credit Law this year opened up the possibility. This was 
also the case up until 1986 for life insurance companies. 
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Table A.11. Exchange control, exchange regulation, and exchange rate policy* 
Early 1970s  Banks' lending and deposits in or from foreign banks was regulated; bounds for the supply of credit from abroad 
were specified in the credit budget.  
May 1972  Norway joined the 'snake' exchange rate cooperation (which included the EEC-countries and Sweden).  
February 1978  The krone was devalued 8 percent (within the snake cooperation).  
November 1978  New rules for the foreign exchange banks' net holdings were introduced as a temporary trial system. The total 
position (which equals net spot debt and net forward claims) at the end of every day had to be approximately zero 
(there was some tolerance for small deviations). All other lending in foreign currency was still required through a 
licence-requirement.  
December 1978  The snake cooperation was to be replaced by a new European currency cooperation. Norway backs out instead, 
and forms its own fixed-rate system where the base is a basket of most important exchange rates.  
January 1980  The limit for the value of a currency-foreigner's portfolio in Norway was increased from 50,000 kroner to 1 mill. 
kroner.  
April 1980  It was decided to keep the trial regulation of foreign exchange banks with some formal limits as what one 
considered as sufficiently close to a zero position. These limits were subject to several changes later on (but 
these changes were of little importance).  
June 1982  The authorities allowed the banks to lend out, in kroner, up to 3 billion kroner per year to the oil industry (which up 
until now had been financed through lending abroad). To improve the competitiveness of the banks, these loans 
were taken out of the basis of calculation for the primary and additional reserve requirements. In 1983 the limit 
was raised to 4.5 billion kroner. In 1985 the limit was raised to 5 billion kroner, and now the loans could be both to 
the oil industry and loans to abroad (with no need for a licence). Statoil's lending was kept outside the limits. In 
1987, the arrangement ended. The main purpose in 1982 was to limit the supply of liquidity caused by large 
surpluses on the current account, but from now on this did not seem necessary, so from 1987 there were given 
few licences for loans to foreigners denominated in kroner.  
June 1982  Foreigners were now permitted to invest as much they wanted in stocks of listed companies. For listed bonds, 
there was still a limit of 1 mill. kroner. Note that it was portfolio-investments that were liberalised. To invest 
directly, one still needed a licence.  
August 1982  The weight of the US dollar in the currency basket was reduced from 25 to 11% (and European currencies were 
given a larger weight). This was in effect a small devaluation of the krone since the dollars had appreciated 
considerably lately.  
September 1982  The krone was devalued by 3% (relative to the currency basket).  
September 1983  Foreign exchange banks were permitted to trade with some forms of currency options.  
June 1984  The limit for how much currency one could purchase before going on vacation was revoked (previously the limit 
was 10,000 kroner per trip). The limit for how much one could spend on holiday cottages abroad was also 
revoked (previously the limit was 400,000 kroner). The ban against financing this through lending abroad was also 
removed, but one still needed a licence to take up the loan.  
June 1984  Domestic residents were permitted to make unlimited investments in stocks of listed companies abroad (as 
portfolio-investments, not direct investments). For non-listed companies, the licensing-process was liberalised, but 
not completely. It was still not permitted to invest in foreign bonds denominated in foreign currency, but second-
hand eurokrone bonds could be purchased. Earlier, the only way to trade foreign securities was over the 'switch 
market', but now this market was shut down (it was not useful any longer). Furthermore, the licence-process for 
direct investments was removed and was only replaced by a system of mandatory reporting of the investments.  
November 1984  Foreigners access to invest in bonds for a value up to 1 mill. kroner was withdrawn. From now on insurance 
companies were the only foreign agents that could invest in the bond market, and these were only given 
permission if it was in order to fulfil their reserve requirements.  
January 1985  Norges Bank started to deposit some of its foreign exchange reserves in domestic foreign exchange banks. The 
main cause was probably to ease the banks' access to foreign exchange. The deposits could not account for 
more than 1.5% of the banks' total assets. In January 1986 the limit was raised to 2%. This arrangement ended in 
May 1986, as one saw that the central bank's reserves were getting too small.  
February 1985  Domestic residents and companies were permitted to invest in foreign bonds denominated in foreign currency, but 
not more than 1 million and 5 million kroner, respectively.  
September 1985  Domestic agents were no longer required to acquire a licence before a domestic bank could extend a loan to them 
denominated in foreign currency.  
February 1986  The foreign exchange banks were permitted to issue commercial papers abroad. Furthermore, since guarantees 
given by financial institutions for loans in the unregulated credit market already were under direct regulation (see 
Table A.12, the licensing-process for guarantees by foreign financial institutions was made very restrictive to 
accommodate the domestic credit policy. This was continued in 1987 and 1988.  
11th of May 1986  The krone was devalued with 12 percent (the target of the index is changed from 100 to 112). The weights were 
unchanged. This was to be the last devaluation of the krone (before it started to float in 1992)  
November 1988  Companies listed on the stock market were given permission to take up long-term loans denominated in foreign 
currency without a licence from Norges Bank, provided that the loan was larger than 1 mill. kroner and that the 
company's share capital was at least 500,000 kroner. In February 1989, the regulation for smaller firms was 
relaxed as well. Any company planning large investments in production capacity would now obtain a licence more 
easily than before, provided that the loan was larger than 1 mill. kroner.  
May 1989  Foreigners were given full access to purchase listed bonds in Norway.  
July 1989  Domestic residents were given full access to purchase shares in foreign listed and non-listed securities funds.  
December 1989  Foreigners were given full access to issue bonds in Norway. Still, purchasing these would be regarded as 
purchasing a foreign asset and to do so, one still needed a licence.  
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June 1990  A new set of foreign exchange regulations was presented. Earlier any transactions was forbidden, unless 
otherwise stated. Now the premise was the opposite: all transactions were permitted, unless otherwise stated. 
The most important of the few regulations left was that only authorised foreign exchange banks could service 
payment transfers between domestic and foreign agents, and this was also the only type of institution that could 
buy and sell foreign currency. In addition to the foreign exchange banks, other financial companies (i.e. banks or 
financing companies) could engage in commercial trading of foreign exchange, but the latter category would have 
limits for their net position of spot and forward claims. Foreigners were given full access to issue and buy 
certificates alongside the previous permission to issue and buy bonds.  
22nd of October 
1990  
The fixed exchange rate arrangement was changed. The krone would now be fixed towards the European 
Currency Unit (Ecu). The value is set to 7.9940 kroner for one ecu, which was neutral compared to the old system 
(no devaluation or revaluation). The margin for acceptable deviations was +/- 2.25 percent.   
10th of December 
1992  
The fixed exchange rate arrangement was given up. At first the margins were suspended and the krone was 
temporarily permitted to float. From the 8th of January 1993 it was a permanent decision. The monetary policy 
would still be conducted with the goal of a stable exchange rate around the level at which the peg was left, but in 
a flexible manner.  
January 1994  As Norway joined the European Economic Area (EEA), financial institutions within the EEA would be permitted to 
trade foreign exchange in Norway if they had their authorisation from another EEA country.  
*Main events and changes are listed: the table is far from complete with respect to all the regulatory changes through the period, but it's worth to include some 
events to grasp the main impression of the development. 
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Table A.12. Other events of relevance 
7th of September 1972  A temporary price freeze was initiated. Lasted until the end of December.  
1st of March 1977  Norges Bank introduced its new short-term market papers (3 months). These were intended to be an 
instrument that could be used to neutralise short-term fluctuations in the liquidity situation of banks. The 
papers were sold for the first time in August 1978.  
December 1977  The interest rate norms were withdrawn, except for some types of mortgages. The interest rate setting in the 
bond market was also made more flexible.  
Beginning of 1978  The government initiated an agreement with the banks which involved limiting the amount that households 
were allowed to borrow for consumption purposes. In total it would be a reduction in the order of 2,000 mill. 
kroner in 1978.  
February 1978  Temporary price freeze. Replaced by a more comprehensive freeze from September (see below).  
12th of September 
1978  
Temporary wage and price freeze. Lasted until the end of 1979.  
1st of January 1979  The rules for the banks' automatic access to loans in Norges Bank were changed. In the old system, 
automatic loans (A-loans) were given in a fairly liberal manner, but with progressive interest rates based on 
the maturity and the size of the loan. The new system kept the A-loans, but reduced the total scale of them, 
and added a new type of loans that had more strings attached (B-loans). The intention of the new system was 
that A-loans would provide the necessary liquidity for seasonal variations, while if banks had to take up B-
loans, they would be put under strict regulations that in principle would be close to additional reserve 
requirements (but a bit more flexible).  
1979  The understanding between the government and the banks was re-understood and the banks agreed to 
reduce lending for consumption purposes by 500 mill. kroner in 1979 (making the total reduction over the last 
two years 2,500 mill. kroner).  
1st of November 1979  Norges Bank temporarily suspended the access to A-loans. The suspension ended in March 1980.  
1980  The banks agreed to offer 6,000 mortgages each year with better conditions than ordinary non-housing 
mortgages (PSV-loans). As a compensation, the government increased the lending bounds by an equivalent 
amount. This arrangement was kept for several years.  
Fall of 1980  The Ministry of Finance started to issue interest rate declarations where it was specified what the Minister 
considered to be an acceptable interest rate level. This was close to the old interest rate norms, but offered 
the banks a bit more flexibility since only the average interest rate level within a few categories mattered; 
within the categories rates could vary more. The first declaration was issued the 1st of September 1980. The 
interest rate on PSV-loans and convertible mortgages would still follow interest rate norms. This formalised 
the control that had remained over interest rates after the wage and prize freeze ended.  
1st of October 1980  The regulation of who that could issue bonds was liberalised: businesses and loan associations were given 
unlimited access to issue bonds. The interest rate was also allowed to float freely. This lead to a surge in 
credit supplied over the bond market.  
2nd of October 1981  Loan associations, except for associations financing ships and an association providing credit for exporting 
firms ('Eksportkreditt'), were not permitted to issue more bonds the rest of the year (hence, partly a re-
regulation of the bond market).  
14th of October 1981  The Conservative Party (Høyre) won the election and took over the government office from the Social 
Democrats (Arbeiderpartiet). The new government wanted to deregulate the Norwegian economy further, 
including the financial markets. It stayed in position for about 5 year (the government included two other 
parties from the summer of 1983).  
12th of March 1982  New regulations for the bond market were released. A loan association were in 1982 permitted to issue 
bonds with a value equal to 1/7 (1/9) of what it issued in 1981 if the bonds were issued publicly (privately). 
Bonds with the purpose of financing houses, municipalities or power plants were regulated more strictly and 
an association needed a permission from the Ministry of Finance in order to issue such. A permission was 
also necessary if bonds were not sold an institution that needed them to fulfil its placement requirement.  
1st of January 1983  Direct regulation of the guarantees that financial institutions issued for loans in the grey market was 
introduced. At the end of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter of 1983, the guarantees could not be more than 64%, 
67%, and 70% higher than the level at the end of the 3rd quarter 1981. At the same time the guarantees had 
to be at least 20%, 30%, and 40% lower than the level at the end of the 3rd quarter of 1982. 
10th of February 1983  New regulations for the bond market were released. A loan association could in 1983 issue bonds with a 
value equal to 40%, 30% and 30% of the amount issued in 1982 in the first, second and third 4-months 
period, respectively. It is interesting to note that the associations did not need a permission to sell bonds to 
the regular non-financial public any longer (provided that the sales were reported to Norges Bank every 
month). This regulation was kept until the end of 1984.  
July 1983  The system with B-loans was suspended and only A-loans were kept.  
1st of July 1984  Direct regulation of the guarantees given by the financial institutions in the unregulated credit market ends. 
Up until now, the guarantees in 1984 had been permitted to grow with 3% compared to the level at the end of 
1983.  
1st of January 1985  New regulations for the bond market. A market for bonds with less than 12 months maturity was introduced 
(market for certificates). The first government certificates were sold the 28th of January. The extra regulation 
of some forms of lending was kept; if the bond was to finance purchase of houses, buildings or projects that 
were finished before 1980, the oil sector, the shipping sector, the primary industries, municipalities or power 
plants (which were owned by municipalities), it had to be approved by the Ministry of Finance. The sum of all 
approved bonds was to be kept within pre-set bounds.  
25th of September 
1985  
The government stopped the issuing of interest rate declarations (i.e., the interest rates were permitted to 
float freely), but the interest rate on PSV-loans continued to follow a norm.  
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1986  The system for banks' automatic lending in Norges Bank was changed several times during 1986. The 1st of 
March the old system with progressive interest rates depending on the size of the loan (step-wise increases 
with 4 steps) was replaced by a system with only one interest rate. Every bank could get short-term loans for 
2 months at value up to 300% of the basis of calculation for their reserve requirement. In Mid-April it was 
decided to increase the limit to 500%, starting from the period March-April because of a tight liquidity 
situation. The 5th of May the setup was changed again because of massive turbulence in the foreign 
exchange markets (and pressure on the krone). The limit was cut to 100%, but at the same time an extra-
ordinary access to loans was introduced: When their limit was reached, the banks could get access to 
unlimited loans from Norges Bank (where the interest rate charged can be changed every day). The system 
went basically back to the pre-May setup from the 1st of July, but this time with a limit at 600%, but the 
interest rate charged could still be changed every day. In October another change came, and now the lending 
period was cut from 2 to 1 month. The limit was also reduced to 400%. 1987 also began with a new minor 
change; now the basis of calculation 2 months ago would matter for the banks' access to loans from Norges 
Bank. A special system was established for banks that have been in business for less than 2 months.  
January 1986  Direct regulation of guarantees issued by financial institutions in the unregulated credit market was 
reintroduced. In every quarter, the guarantees issued could not be exceed 95% of the total guarantees 
outstanding at the end of 1985.  
May 1986  Financial institutions were, if given a special permission from the Ministry of Finance, permitted to issue 
bonds in order to get subordinated debt.  
January 1987  The direct regulation of guarantees issued by financial institutions in the unregulated credit market from 1986 
was kept (the exact same, i.e. in every quarter, the guarantees given could not exceed 95% of the total 
guarantees outstanding at the end of 1985).  
 
May 1987  Banks' access to loans from Norges Bank was expanded and updated. Now there would be two types of 
loans: D-loans (one-day loans) and F-loans (fixed-interest loans for a period of up to 12 months). The 
intention with the latter kind was to reduce the impact of changes in short-term interest rates on mortgage 
loans. In the beginning Norges Bank would offer F-loans with a pre-set interest rate, but in October it started 
a system with auctions instead.  
July 1987  Banks and finance companies were given permission to freely issue bonds with a maturity up to 24 months. 
Loan associations were permitted to issue certificates (but the regulation of certain lending purposes from 
1985 was still active). In April 1989, the time-limit was raised to 36 months, and then it was removed in July 
1990.  
January 1988  The direct regulation of guarantees issued by financial institutions in the unregulated credit market from 1986 
was kept (the exact same, i.e. in every quarter, the guarantees given could not exceed 95% of the total 
guarantees outstanding at the end of 1985). The regulation was then revoked from the 1st of July 1988.  
April 1988  Banks' access to loans in Norges Bank was revised: The basis of calculation for access to D-loans was 
changed to be each bank’s total assets minus its holding of D-loans. In August the F-loan access was revised 
too; now commercial banks could get F-loans equal to three times their capital, while the limit was four times 
their capital for savings banks.  
May 1988  A new type of loans from Norges Bank to the banks was introduced: G-loans. These were not a part of the 
liquidity facility of the central bank, but politically motivated. The loans had a favourable interest rate (for the 
banks) and were intended to compensate the banks for their promise to cut the interest rate on various house 
mortgages. This was a temporary arrangement and was ended in the spring the year after.  
July 1988  The bounds for the loan associations regarding loans for house-purchases, primary industries and power 
plants were removed.  
December 1988  D-loan access was temporarily made more restrictive; for now it depended on the banks' balances at the end 
of 1987.  
March 1989  The remaining limitations (bounds) for the loan associations were removed. This especially concerned 
lending to municipalities.  
December 1990  New basis of calculation for the access to D-loans and F-loans. The basis of calculation would be the bank's 
own funds minus its subordinated debt. The limits for F-loan access was changed: for F-loans with a maturity 
shorter than 12 months the limit was 400% of the basis, and the loans could be no greater than 20% of the 
bank's total assets. For longer maturities the limit was 200% of the basis and 10% of the total assets.  
July 1991  New limits for the access to F-loans. It was cut from 400 to 350% for loans with a maturity shorter than 12 
months, and from 200 to 175% for longer maturities. At the same time the basis of calculation was updated 
and a bank's own funds are now measured according to the rules from April 1991 in Table A.1.  
November 1991  Norges Bank introduced a temporary arrangement with "G-deposits". These were deposits Norges Bank 
would offer to private banks and it came with favourable interest rates (for the banks). This was done to 
reduce the banks' financing costs. The arrangement was phased out in November 1992.  
Tax year of 1992  The tax system was reformed (it was passed by the Storting in 1991). Main change was a flatter tax system 
with a broader tax base. Marginal rate on capital income was educed from 40.5% to 28% (the average 
effective reduction was at least 5 percentage points smaller). Marginal rates on wage income was reduced as 
well.  
October 1992  Norges Bank introduced a counterpart to F-loans, namely F-deposits. These were deposits made by the 
banks in Norges Bank to a fixed interest rate. Furthermore the access to F-loans was cut down to 100% of 
the basis of calculation (and still no greater than 20% of a bank's total assets).  
November 1992  Norges Bank temporarily limited the access to D-loans by 50%.  
November 1992  Norges Bank temporarily increased the access to F-loans as a reaction to turbulence in the foreign exchange 
markets. The access was set back to its level from October 1992 after February 1994.  
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November 1993  Norges Bank overhauled its system for providing liquidity to the banks. The goal was to reduce the banks' net 
debt position vis a vis Norges Bank. If banks were net depositors instead, the sight deposit rate would start 
acting as a floor for the money market rate while the D-loan rate will be a roof, and the policy of Norges Bank 
would have to adjust to this. Starting from the 1st of November 1994, banks would have to provide collateral 
for their D-loans. As collateral for a loan, Norges Bank would accept F-deposits, government bonds and 
certificates, and government guaranteed bonds or certificates at 95% of face value. Bonds from municipalities 
and loan associations were accepted at 85% of face value. Temporarily, a bank's access to D-loans would 
amount to its F-deposits the same day plus 4 times the other collateral it provided. From the 1st of September 
1995, the access was cut to just its F-deposits and other collateral provided (i.e. loans had to be a 100% 
guaranteed).  
 
December 1993  As Norway joined the European Economic Area (EEA), foreign banks with their main office in the EEA got 
access to D-loans, provided that they had offices in Norway and provided bank services in the country.  
August 1996  Foreign banks (i.e. banks with a main office abroad and not just in the EEA) got access to D-loans, provided 
that they had offices in Norway and provided bank services in the country. Furthermore, Norges Bank 
expanded what it accepted as collateral for D-loans to cover bonds and certificates either issued or 
guaranteed by foreign governments from within the OECD-area. What the central bank accepted as collateral 
was then updated several times the rest of the period, but the details will not be given in this document.  
October 1996  Norges Bank introduced a system with repurchase agreements for government papers as a way to provide 
liquidity to the money market. This would partly replace the F-loans, but the latter system was kept as well.  
June 1997  Norges Bank changed its system for banks' access to loans and deposits. D-loans were split in two: intra day 
loans and overnight loans (the old D-loans corresponded to the latter). Norges Bank required collateral for 
both types of loans, but intra day loans were free of interest.  
July 1999  Norges Bank started to require collateral for F-loans as well. The same type of collateral was required for F-
loans as for the overnight loans.  
March 2001  A new monetary policy regime was introduced in Norway: Norges Bank got the responsibility for conducting 
flexible inflation targeting with a target at 2.5%.  
May 2001  Up until now there had been limits for how large a bank's cumulative debt in Norges Bank could be. Now 
these limits were removed such that a bank could borrow as much as it wanted as long as it provided 
collateral for the loans.  
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